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Abstract
Device-independent security is the gold standard for quantum cryptography: not only is security based
entirely on the laws of quantum mechanics, but it holds irrespective of any a priori assumptions on the
quantum devices used in a protocol, making it particularly applicable in a quantum-wary environment.
While the existence of device-independent protocols for tasks such as randomness expansion and quantum
key distribution has recently been established, the underlying proofs of security remain very challenging,
yield rather poor key rates, and demand very high-quality quantum devices, thus making them all but
impossible to implement in practice.
We introduce a technique for the analysis of device-independent cryptographic protocols. We provide
a flexible protocol and give a security proof that provides quantitative bounds that are asymptotically
tight, even in the presence of general quantum adversaries. At a high level our approach amounts
to establishing a reduction to the scenario in which the untrusted device operates in an identical and
independent way in each round of the protocol. This is achieved by leveraging the sequential nature of
the protocol, and makes use of a newly developed tool, the “entropy accumulation theorem” of Dupuis
et al. [DFR16].
As concrete applications we give simple and modular security proofs for device-independent quantum
key distribution and randomness expansion protocols based on the CHSH inequality. For both tasks
we establish essentially optimal asymptotic key rates and noise tolerance. In view of recent experimen-
tal progress, which has culminated in loophole-free Bell tests, it is likely that these protocols can be
practically implemented in the near future.
1 Introduction
Classical cryptography relies on computational assumptions, such as the hardness of factoring, to deliver a
wide range of functionalities, from secure communication to secure distributed computation and program
obfuscation. The advent of quantum information in the 1980s brought forward a completely different possi-
bility: security based only on the fundamental laws of physics. The quantum protocols for key distribution
by Bennett and Brassard [BB84] and Ekert [Eke91] allow mutually trustful users connected only by an au-
thenticated classical channel, and an arbitrary quantum channel, to establish a private key whose security
is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. With their private key, the users can then communicate
with perfect security using, e.g., a one-time pad.
Quantum information is a double-edged sword. A typical protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD)
requires the users, Alice and Bob, to manipulate quantum states: for example, in Ekert’s protocol Alice has
to prepare multiple entangled pairs of photons, and send one photon from each pair to Bob; both users then
perform specific measurements on their respective photons in order to generate the classical key. The first
proofs of security for QKD crucially relied on the fact that each user’s internal operations were implemented
in a specific way: the state preparation implemented by Alice, the measurements performed by Bob, all
had to follow the low-level prescription given in the protocol. Initial implementations of QKD revealed how
delicate these assumptions are. This is not only a question of the quality of the devices used. A wide range
of side-channel attacks [FQTL07, LWW+10, WKR+11, GLLL+11] were able to successfully exploit the very
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phenomena of quantum mechanics on which the security of QKD relies, such as the no-cloning or uncertainty
principles, to provide attacks that did not respect some of the assumptions made by the security proofs, that
were difficult, if not impossible, to verify in practice (such as the assumption that Alice prepares a single
pair of photons at a time, and not a more complex system with additional, undetected degrees of freedom
that could leak information to an eavesdropper).
The paradigm of device-independence offers an uncompromising solution to this conundrum. A crypto-
graphic protocol is termed device-independent (DI) if its security guarantees hold irrespective of the quality,
or trustworthiness, of the physical devices used to implement the protocol [MY98, BHK05] (see [ER14] for a
perspective article). Security in such protocols should be based only on the statistics observed by the honest
parties executing the protocol. In other words, any execution of the protocol should contain a “proof” that
the generated key is secure, a proof that remains valid as long as very mild assumptions on the physical
devices used are satisfied (informally, that no information is exchanged between the users’ and eavesdroppers’
laboratories, arguably an unavoidable requirement).
Although the formulation of the DI paradigm appeared only much later in work of Mayers and Yao, the
possibility for device-independence was arguably already present in Ekert’s protocol. Ekert’s intuition was
to tie privacy of the users’ key to the non-local effects that led to the generation of the key (measurement
of a Bell pair). Ekert observed that quantum entanglement allows distant parties to generate bits that
are correlated in such a strong way that it (seemingly) precludes any correlation with a third party — a
phenomenon now known as the monogamy of correlations.
The framework for the study of non-locality was put in place by Bell in the 1960s [Bel64]. Motivated
by questions in the foundations of quantum mechanics (including a proposal for an experiment that could
in principle test the EPR “paradox” [EPR35]), Bell introduced the notion of what is now known as a Bell
inequality (see [Sca13, BCP+14] for excellent reviews on the topic). In the context of device-independence
we interpret a Bell inequality [Bel64] as the specification of a small game1 that can be played by the honest
parties using their respective quantum devices. What makes the game interesting is that it is designed in a
way such that any classical strategy for the devices (i.e., any model for their actions that can be implemented
as a convex combination of deterministic strategies) leads to a success probability ωc in the game such that
ωc < 1. In contrast, there exists a quantum strategy (i.e., one in which the devices determine outcomes in
the game by performing local measurements on a shared entangled state) that achieves a greater success
probability, ωq > ωc. The use of such a game has the following major immediate consequence: if the honest
parties observe that their devices are able to attain a success probability that is strictly larger than ωc,
they can conclude that their devices must be non-classical — the devices must share entanglement. This
provides a first step in the implementation of the DI program: a statistical test that can be performed
with the devices and that guarantees some element of quantumness. Early results in device-independence
went further by establishing a quantitative relationship between the devices’ success probability and the
amount of secret randomness produced during the game [PAM+10, AMP12], leading to a “statistical test
for information-theoretically secure randomness” [Col06], a task that is provably impossible to achieve using
classical systems alone.
In the past decade an extended line of works has explored the application of the device-independence
paradigm to multiple cryptographic tasks. A partial list includes QKD [BHK05, PAB+09, VV14], random-
ness expansion [PAM+10, VV12, CY13, MS14a] and amplification [CR12, GMDLT+13, CSW14, BRG+16,
KAF17], verified quantum computation [GKW15, HPDF15, CGJV17], bit commitment [AMPS15] and weak
string erasure [KW16]. For virtually all these tasks a proof of security ultimately amounts to bounding
the knowledge that an adversary (a malicious party, or an eavesdropper) can gain about the output of the
protocol. This knowledge, or uncertainty, is modeled using a notion of entropy called the smooth conditional
min-entropy [Ren05]. In the case of QKD, for example, the output is the raw key K, and proving security
is essentially equivalent2 to establishing a lower bound on the smooth conditional min-entropy Hεmin(K|E),
where E is the quantum system held by Eve, which can be initially correlated to the device producing K
1For an explicit example of a game see Section 2.3.
2From that point onward standard classical post-processing steps, e.g., error correction and privacy amplification, suffice to
prove the security of the protocol; see Section 5 for the details.
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(for formal definitions see Section 2).
Evaluating the smooth min-entropy Hεmin(K|E) of a large system is often difficult, especially in the DI
setting where not much is known about the way K is produced. One assumption commonly used to simplify
this task is that the bits of K = K1, . . . ,Kn are created in an independent and identical way and hence K
itself is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable. That is, it is assumed that the
device held by Alice and Bob makes the same measurements on the same quantum states in every round
of the protocol. This means that the device is initialized with some (unknown) state which has a tensor
product structure ρ⊗nAB, and that the measurements have a tensor product structure as well. In that case, the
total entropy in K can be easily related to the sum of the entropies in each round separately.3 A bound on
the entropy accumulated in one round can usually be derived using the expected winning probability in the
game played in that round, which in turn can be easily estimated during the protocol in the i.i.d. case using
standard Chernoff-type bounds since the same game is just being played repeatedly with the same strategy.
Unfortunately, even though quite convenient (and, in many cases, seemingly necessary) for the analysis,
the i.i.d. assumption is a very strong one in the DI scenario. In particular, under such an assumption the
device cannot use any internal memory (i.e., its actions in one round cannot depend on the previous rounds)
or even display time-dependent behavior (due to inevitable imperfections for example).
Without this assumption about the device, however, not much is a priori known about the structure
of K, the expected winning probability in one round of the protocol, nor the way the total entropy of K
is accumulated one round after the other (as the device might correlate the different rounds in an almost
arbitrary way). Therefore, security proofs that estimated Hεmin(K|E) directly for the most general case had
to use far more complicated techniques and statistical analysis compared to the i.i.d. case.4
1.1 Results and contributions
We introduce a general framework, consisting of a flexible protocol and analysis, for obtaining DI proofs of
security for a broad range of cryptographic tasks. Our technique takes advantage of the sequential nature
of the protocol, as well as the specific way in which classical statistics are collected by users of the protocol,
to establish a reduction to the i.i.d. setting. A major advantage of our approach is that the reduction is
virtually lossless in terms of parameters. Hence, our result establishes the a priori surprising fact that general
quantum adversaries are no stronger than an adversary restricted to i.i.d. attacks. As a consequence, we are
able to extend tight results known for, e.g., DIQKD, under the i.i.d. assumption, to the most general setting.
This yields the best rates known for any protocol for a DI cryptographic task.
To further discuss our results we state an informal version of our main theorem, that describes the
entropy generation guarantees of our protocol (see Lemma 10 for a formal statement, and Theorem 11 for
the specialization of the protocol to the CHSH inequality).
Theorem 1 (Main theorem, informal). Fix a choice of parameters, including an underlying non-local game,
for Protocol 1. Then there exist constants c1, c2 > 0 such that the following holds. Let D be any device and
ρ|Ω the state generated using Protocol 1, conditioned on the protocol not aborting. Then for any ε1, ε2 ∈ (0, 1),
either the protocol aborts with probability greater than 1− ε1 or
Hε2min (AB|XYTFE)ρ|Ω > c1n− c2
√
n log(1/ε1ε2) . (1)
We remark that there are multiple implementations of devices that when used in an execution of Protocol 1
lead to a negligible probability of the protocol aborting (this is formalized in our completeness statement;
see Section 3.2). Importantly, devices that are within reach of current state-of-the-art technology also belong
to this set of devices. Thus, Theorem 1 gives a non-trivial bound on the entropy produced by such devices.
This was not achieved by previous works as discussed in Section 1.2.
Let us explain (1). The registers AB contain the classical outputs generated by the device during the
protocol. The registersXYTF contain the classical inputs selected by the users, as well as auxiliary classical
3Formally the bound can be calculated using the quantum asymptotic equipartition property [TCR09] for example.
4This led to non-optimal proofs, both readability- and parameter-wise (e.g., key rates or amount of tolerable noise). See
Section 1.2 for a discussion of related works.
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information exchanged during the protocol, that may be leaked to the adversary. E is a quantum register
that describes the adversary’s quantum system, that may be correlated with the initial state of the devices.
Thus, (1) gives a very precise bound on the amount of the smooth min-entropy present in the users’ outputs
at the end of the protocol, conditioned on all information available to the adversary. (As we discuss later, this
formulation is flexible enough that it can be applied to obtain guarantees not only for the task of randomness
generation, but also for quantum key distribution and other cryptographic tasks.)
We give explicit formulas for computing the constants c1 and c2 that appear in (1), as a function of the
parameters of the protocol (such as the fraction of rounds used for testing and the threshold value based on
which the decision to accept or reject is made). Importantly, the constant c1 that governs the leading-order
term equals the optimal constant, i.e., the same leading constant that would be obtained under the i.i.d.
assumption, which by the asymptotic equipartition property is the Shannon entropy accumulated in one
round of the protocol. Thus our result implies that general quantum adversaries do not force weaker rates
compared to those achieved in less general scenarios. That is, it is possible to achieve rate vs. noise tradeoffs
which are as good as those achieved in much more restricted settings such as under the i.i.d. assumption.
To determine the constant c1 the user of our result must perform only one further crucial optimiza-
tion: identify a so-called “min-tradeoff function”, a convex, differentiable function that lower bounds the
conditional Shannon entropy generated in a single round of the protocol, as a function of the game value.
Informally, the requirement that the min-tradeoff function is differentiable and convex allows to account for
lower-order fluctuations in the entropy generated that arise from finite statistics. In Section 4 we give a
min-tradeoff function that can be used when the game that underlies the protocol is the CHSH game of
Clauser et al. [CHSH69]. Other use cases may require other min-tradeoff functions; indeed in Section 1.2
below we survey recent works that applied our results to a variety of scenarios by computing an appropriate
min-tradeoff function.
As already mentioned, beyond the first-order term in (1) our result also provides control over the con-
stant c2 in front of the second-order term. Such control is a necessary condition for any application where
finite values of n need to be considered, such as in cryptography, and even more so quantum cryptog-
raphy, where values of n that can be achieved in practice remain relatively small. (See e.g. Figure 6,
where one can see that finite-size effects can play an important role up to even moderately large val-
ues of n ≈ 1010.) As loophole-free Bell tests (a necessity for DI cryptography) are finally being real-
ized [HBD+15, SMSC+15, GVW+15], the ability to derive essentially optimal values for c1 and c2 con-
siderably decreases the gap between theory and experiments, thereby marking an important step towards
practical DI protocols and their implementations.
We provide two concrete applications for Theorem 1. To begin with, we consider a DIQKD protocol based
on the CHSH game, and prove its security. The achieved key rates and noise tolerance are significantly higher
than in previous works. For large enough number of rounds n, the key rate as a function of the noise tolerance
essentially coincides with the optimal result of [PAB+09], derived for the restricted i.i.d. and asymptotic
case. In particular, as in [PAB+09], we show that the protocol can tolerate up to the optimal error rate
of 7.1% while still producing a positive key rate. (For comparison5, in [VV14] the maximal noise tolerance
was 1.6%). Moreover, the achieved key rates are comparable to those achieved in device-dependent QKD
protocols [SR08a, SR08b] already starting from n = 106. (For further details and plots see Section 5.5.2).
As a second application we consider a randomness expansion protocol based on the CHSH inequality. Here
as well, we obtain an expansion rate which is essentially the same as the optimal rate achieved in [PAM+10]
in the case of classical adversaries only, while our result holds against quantum adversaries. This is much
better than the rates obtained in previous works [VV12, MS14a, MS14b].
Main ideas of the proof. As expressed earlier, the main difficulty in the analysis is to overcome the
lack of any a priori independence assumptions on the quantum state shared by the users’ devices, as well
as a potential eavesdropper. Towards this we first leverage the sequential nature of the protocol. Our
approach is to show that the random variables that model events observed by the users (such as the classical
input/output behavior of their device in successive rounds) obey a natural Markov property. Using that
5The noise models of the two works are a bit different; the value of 1.6% is the relevant one after equating the models.
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property, we are able to apply a newly developed tool, the “entropy accumulation theorem” [DFR16] (EAT),
to act as a replacement for the chain rule for the conditional smooth min-entropy. The EAT allows us to
quantify how entropy “accumulates” across many random variables generated through a certain iterative
quantum processes as long as it fulfills a number of conditions that are tied to the Markov property (see
Section 2.6 for the exact statement). As a result, we obtain a modular protocol that can be used as a
“skeleton” for many DI cryptographic tasks; the protocol comes with fine-tuned guarantees on the entropy
that is generated throughout, as a function of quantities that can be estimated based on the analysis of a
single round of the protocol. Next, we provide a concrete instantiation of the protocol based on the CHSH
inequality. By combining the results of [PAB+09], derived for the i.i.d. case, with our analysis of the general
protocol we obtain a lower bound on the generated entropy rate when using the CHSH inequality as a basis
for the protocol. Finally, we apply our results to prove security of a DIQKD protocol that we propose, with
essentially optimal key rate and noise tolerance.
1.2 Related and subsequent work
The idea of basing the security of cryptographic protocols (QKD especially) on the violation of Bell in-
equalities originates in the celebrated work of Ekert [Eke91]. Later, Mayers and Yao [MY98] recognized
that devices maximally violating a Bell inequality (they considered a variant of the CHSH inequality) could
be fully characterized, up to local degrees of freedom, and thus need not be trusted a priori. Barrett et
al. [BHK05] were the first to combine both ideas together and derive a proof of security for QKD in the
DI scenario. Their security proof holds even in the presence of a super-quantum adversary, limited only by
the non-signalling principle. The protocol of [BHK05], however, could not tolerate any amount of noise and
produced just one secret bit when using the device many times (i.e. the key rate is zero).
Following these initial works a long line of research [AGM06, AMP06, SGB+06, ABG+07, Mas09,
PAB+09, HRW10, HR10, MPA11, MRC+14] led to protocols, and proof techniques, that establish non-
vanishing key rates with a positive noise tolerance in the i.i.d. setting, against quantum or super-quantum
adversaries (the former typically leading to better rates and noise tolerance). Most relevant for our work are
the results of [PAB+09], where security of a DIQKD protocol was proven in the asymptotic limit, i.e., when
the device is used n → ∞ times, and under the i.i.d. assumption described above. Their protocol is based
on the CHSH inequality [CHSH69], and their analysis shows that it achieves the best possible rates under
these assumptions.
For the more challenging scenario presented by the non-i.i.d. setting, security was first established
in [VV14]; see also [RUV13], who give a secure protocol but with vanishing rate and no noise tolerance.
A more recent proof of security by Miller and Shi [MS14a] is closest to our results in that it bounds the
amount of entropy generated in the protocol in a round-by-round fashion, similar in spirit (but technically
very different) from our use of the EAT (see Section 2.6 for a description). The security proofs of the existing
works are quite complex and achieve relatively low key rates and noise tolerance (if any).
Although it was introduced only much more recently than QKD, the first task to have received a com-
plete proof of security in the DI setting is the task of randomness expansion. This task, first considered
in [Col06], is the problem of expanding a short initial amount of seed randomness into a longer string that
is information-theoretically random; aside of its practical relevance the task received attention because it
is one the simplest problems that is classically impossible, yet for which quantum computing provides an
information-theoretically secure solution. In the non-i.i.d. setting it was shown in [PAM+10] that a quadratic
expansion was possible, but the analysis in that paper was limited to the case of classical adversaries. Secu-
rity against quantum adversaries was established in [VV12], where it was shown that exponential expansion
is possible. The analysis of [VV12], however, does not tolerate noise in the devices; subsequent work [MS14a]
provided a different analysis that is able to tolerate a positive noise rate.
The maximum amount of randomness that can be generated from one system violating a specific Bell
inequality by a given amount has been well-studied. In [PAM+10] tight bounds for the CHSH game are
obtained; see, e.g., [DPA13, LBS+14] for recent works exploring different aspects of the question. However,
when using the device repeatedly, in the non-i.i.d. setting, few works give explicit rates; to the best of our
knowledge the only quantitative results available are from [MS14b] (see also [PM13, FGS13] for an analysis
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in the non-i.i.d. case but under the assumption that the adversary holds only classical side information), and
remain relatively weak in comparison to the best one may expect from the known results under the i.i.d.
assumption.
Since the initial announcement of our work in [AFDF+18],6 our framework has already been applied
to a variety of additional tasks, including conference key agreement [RMW17], randomness expansion and
privatization [KAF17], and randomness generation with sublinear quantum resources [BMP17]. Our results
have been applied to the analysis of the first experimental implementations of a protocol for randomness
generation in the fully DI framework [LYL+17, SLT+18]. In all these cases the difficulty consists in establish-
ing a good min-tradeoff function by analyzing in detail a single round of the protocol used; our results then
almost automatically imply the appropriate rate for the n-round protocol. More recently, the second-order
terms in the EAT have been improved in [DF18].
Structure of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. We start with some preliminaries in Section 2.
In Section 3 we show how the EAT can be used in DI protocols for a general Bell inequality. Then, in
Section 4 we explicitly calculate and plot the entropy rates for the case of the CHSH inequality. We continue
in Sections 5 and 6 with our DIQKD and randomness expansion protocols, respectively. We end in Section 7
with some open questions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 General notation
All logarithms are in base 2. Random variables (RV) are denoted by capital letters while specific values are
denoted by small letters. We denote vectors in bold face; for example, X = X1, . . . , Xn is a vector of RV.
Sets are denoted with calligraphic fonts.
The set {1, 2, . . . , n} is denoted by [n].
Given a value c = c1, . . . , cn ∈ Cn, where C is a finite alphabet, we denote by freqc the probability
distribution over C defined by freqc(c˜) = |{i|ci=c˜}|n for c˜ ∈ C.
We assume familiarity with the standard notation for quantum states and measurements; see [NC02] for
a comprehensive introduction. We generally index pure quantum states or density matrices by the registers
on which they are supported, e.g. ρAB is a density matrix supported on the Hilbert space HA⊗HB. If ρCE
is a state classical on C we write Pr [c]ρ to denote the probability that ρ assigns to c. For m ∈ N+, ρUm
denotes the completely mixed state on m qubits and I is the identity operator.
Let f : S → R be a function over some set S ⊂ Rm. Then the infinity norm of the gradient of f is defined
as
‖∇f‖∞ = sup
{∣∣∣ ∂
∂xi
f(x)
∣∣∣ : x ∈ S, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} .
For convenience all important parameters, constants, and random variables used in the paper are listed
in the tables in the appendix.
2.2 Entropies and Markov chains
Entropies and conditional entropies. h is used for the binary entropy function h(p) = −p log(p) −
(1 − p) log(1 − p). The von Neumann entropy H(ρ) of a quantum state ρ is given by H(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log ρ).
Given a bipartite state ρAE ∈ HA ⊗HE the conditional von Neumann entropy is defined as H(A|E)ρAE =
H(ρAE)−H(ρE). When the state on which the entropy is evaluated is clear from the context we drop the
subscript and write H(A|E).
6The publication [AFDF+18] is an extended abstract that presents the main results reported in this submission, but has a
much more limited discussion of applications, and only contains informal proof sketches.
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Min-entropy. Given a state classical on A, ρAE =
∑
a pa |a〉〈a| ⊗ ρaE , the conditional min-entropy is
Hmin(A|E) = − log pguess(A|E) ,
where pguess(A|E) is the maximum probability of guessing A given the quantum system E:
pguess(A|E) = max{Ma
E
}a
∑
a
paTr(M
a
Eρ
a
E) ,
and the maximum is taken over all POVMs {MaE}a on E. For any quantum state ρAE , H(A|E) ≥ Hmin(A|E).
The smooth conditional min-entropy with smoothness parameter ε of a state ρAE is defined to be
Hεmin(A|E)ρAE = maxσAE∈Bε(ρAE)Hmin(A|E)σAE , for Bε(ρAE) the set of sub-normalised states σAE with
P (ρAE , σAE) ≤ ε, where P is the purified distance [TCR10].
Max-entropy. The quantum smooth max-entropy of a state ρAE is given by
Hεmax(A|E)ρAE = log inf
σAE∈Bε(ρAE)
sup
τE
‖σ 12AEτ
− 12
E ‖21 .
We will also use the closely related Hε0 entropy. For classical X and Y distributed according to PXY,
H0(X|Y) = maxy log
∣∣Supp (PX|Y=y)∣∣, where Supp (PX|Y=y) = {x|PX|Y=y (x) > 0}. Its smooth version is
given by
Hε0 (X|Y) = min
Ω
max
y
log
∣∣Supp (PX|Ω,Y=y)∣∣ ,
where the minimum ranges over all events Ω with probability at least 1− ε.
Markov chains. A tripartite quantum state ρABC is said to fulfil the Markov chain condition A↔ B ↔ C
if I(A : C|B) = 0, where I(A : C|B) = H(AB) + H(BC) − H(B) − H(ABC) is the conditional mutual
information. I(A : C|B) = 0 if and only if given B, A and C are independent.7
2.3 Non-local games
We consider general two-player non-local games G. In a game G, the two players, Alice and Bob, share a
bipartite quantum state. Given a question for Alice and a question for Bob, they can choose how to measure
their parts of the state, and then use the measurements outcomes to supply an answer each. They win if
their answers fulfil a pre-defined requirement, called the winning criterion.
More formally, a game G is defined via sets of questions and answers for Alice and Bob, X ,Y and A,B, a
distribution π over X ×Y (we will generally assume this is a product distribution), and a winning criterion
w : X × Y ×A× B → {0, 1}.8
A strategy for the players in a game G is specified by, first, a bipartite state ρQAQB , where Alice holds
register QA and Bob register QB, and second, local measurements that each player performs on his or her
register in order to determine the answer to the given question. We use ω ∈ [0, 1] to denote the winning
probability of a strategy in the game G.
We sometimes use the equivalent language of Bell inequalities. The Bell functional associated to a nonlocal
game is the linear function from RX×Y×A×B to R that maps a tuple p to
∑
x,y,a,b π(x, y)w(x, y, a, b)p(x, y, a, b).
In this language, the quantum value of the game is also called the largest violation of the Bell inequality, i.e.,
the largest value attained by the Bell functional when evaluated on tuples p that correspond to conditional
distributions that can be realized by performing local measurements on an entangled state.
7There are also other equivalent ways of defining Markov chains for quantum states [HJPW04], but for our purposes this
definition suffices.
8A general Bell inequality would allow for an R-valued w; we will not need this here.
7
The CHSH game. We use a variant of the CHSH game previously used in [PAB+09, VV14] in the
context of DIQKD. In this game Alice has two possible inputs X = {0, 1} and Bob three possible inputs
Y = {0, 1, 2}. The output sets are A = B = {0, 1}. The input distribution πCHSH is uniform on X ×Y. The
winning condition is the following:9
wCHSH =


1 x, y ∈ {0, 1} and a⊕ b = x · y
1 (x, y) = (0, 2) and a = b
0 otherwise.
The optimal quantum strategy for this game is the same as in the standard CHSH game [CHSH69], except
that if Bob’s input is a 2 he applies the same measurement as Alice’s measurement on input 0. Since the
underlying state is maximally entangled this ensures that their outputs will always match when (x, y) = (0, 2).
Conditioned on Bob’s input not being 2, the game played is the CHSH game. The optimal quantum
strategy in the CHSH game achieves winning probability ω = 2+
√
2
4 ≈ 0.85, while the optimal classical
strategy achieves a winning probability of 0.75.
Instead of describing the quantum advantage in the CHSH game in terms of the winning probability one
can also work with the correlation coefficients defined by: Exy = Pr[a = b|x, y] − Pr[a 6= b|xy] for any pair
of inputs (x, y). The CHSH value is then given by β = E00 + E01 + E10 − E11. The relation between the
winning probability in the CHSH game and the CHSH value is given by ω = 1/2 + β/8. The largest values
that these quantities can take in the classical case are β = 2 and ω = 34 , and the optimal quantum are
β = 2
√
2 and ω = 2+
√
2
4 .
2.4 Untrusted device
In a DI protocol the honest parties interact with an untrusted device. We now explain what is meant by
this term and what are the assumptions regarding such a device. For simplicity we consider the case of two
honest parties, Alice and Bob, but this can be extended to more parties in the obvious way.
A device D is modelled by a tripartite apparatus (including both state and measurements devices),
distributed between Alice, Bob, and the adversary Eve. We think of the device as being prepared by Eve,
and hence we call it untrusted. This allows Eve, in particular, to keep a purification of Alice and Bob’s
quantum state in a quantum register in her possession.10 Although the device is untrusted we always
assume that the following requirements hold (some of these requirements can be verified).
The device can be used to run the considered protocol. That is, Alice and Bob can interact with
D according to the relevant protocol (for an example of a protocol, see Protocol 1 below). Alice and Bob’s
components of D implement the protocol by making sequential measurements on quantum states. In each
round of the protocol, we say that the device is implementing some strategy for the game G being played.
The device may have memory, and thus apply a different strategy each time the game is played, depending
on the previous rounds. Therefore, the measurement operators may change in each round, and the state on
which the measurements are performed may be the post-measurement state from the previous round, a new
state, or any combination of these two.
We sometimes use the terminology honest device or honest implementation. A device is said to be honest
if it implements the protocol by using a certain pre-specified strategy. In that case, the actions of the device
are known and fixed (noise can still be present).
Communication (signalling) between the components of the device. The communication between
Alice, Bob, and Eve’s components is restricted in the following way:
9The value of wCHSH for the inputs (x, y) = (1, 2) is left undefined, as it is never used.
10We emphasise that Eve is not required to measure her quantum state at any particular point. During the run of the
considered protocol, Eve can eavesdrop on all the classical communication between the honest parties, and can later choose to
measure her quantum register depending on this information.
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1. Alice and Bob’s components of D cannot signal to Eve’s component.
2. Alice and Bob can decide when to allow communication (if any) between their components. This
ensures that the underlying quantum state of Alice and Bob’s components of the device is (at least)
bipartite and that the measurements made in the two components, in each round, are in tensor product
with one another.
3. Alice and Bob can decide when to receive communication (if any) from Eve’s component.
The requirement given in Item 1 is necessary for DI cryptography; without it the device could directly
send to Eve all the raw data it generated.
Item 2 implies that Alice and Bob’s component must be (at least) bipartite. This is necessary to assure
that the violation of the considered Bell inequality is meaningful and implies security.
Items 2 and 3 give Alice, Bob, and Eve’s components the possibility to communicate in certain stages of
the protocol. This is not a restrictive nor necessary assumption. This possibility to communicate is added
since it is advantageous to actual implementations of certain protocols. To be specific, we consider the
following scenario. In-between different rounds of the protocol, Alice and Bob’s components of the device are
allowed to communicate freely. During the execution of a single round, however, no communication is allowed.
In particular, when the game is being played, there is no communication between the components once the
honest parties’ inputs are chosen and until the outputs are supplied by the device.11 Furthermore, in-between
rounds Eve may send information to the device, but not receive any from it. In actual implementations
this implies that entanglement can be distributed “on the fly” for each round of the protocol, instead of
maintaining large quantum memories.
Other assumptions. Apart from the above description of the untrusted device, we assume the following
other standard assumptions used in DI cryptography:
1. The honest parties’ physical locations are secure (unwanted information cannot leak outside to Eve or
between their devices).
2. The honest parties have a trusted random number generator.
3. The honest parties have trusted classical post-processing units to make the necessary (classical) calcu-
lations during the protocol.
4. There is an authenticated, but public, classical channel connecting the honest parties (if necessary).
5. Quantum physics is correct.
2.5 Security definitions
DIQKD. A DIQKD protocol (see Section 5 for a description of an explicit protocol) consists of an inter-
action between two trusted parties, Alice and Bob, and an untrusted device as defined in Section 2.4. At
the end of the protocol each party outputs a key, K˜A for Alice and K˜B for Bob. The goal of the adversary,
Eve, is to gain as much information as possible about Alice and Bob’s keys without being detected (i.e., in
the case where the protocol is not being aborted).
Correctness, secrecy, and overall security of a protocol are defined as follows (see also [PR14, Bea15]):
Definition 2 (Correctness). A DIQKD protocol is said to be εcorr-correct, when implemented using a device
D, if Alice and Bob’s keys, K˜A and K˜B respectively, are identical with probability at least 1 − εcorr. That
is, Pr(K˜A 6= K˜B) ≤ εcorr.
11To be more precise and concrete, in Protocol 1 for example, communication is allowed in every round i right after Step 4
is done, and until the beginning of round i+ 1, i.e., before Ti+1 is chosen.
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Definition 3 (Secrecy). A DIQKD protocol is said to be εsec-secret, when implemented using a device D,
if for a key of length l, (1− Pr[abort]) ‖ρK˜AE − ρUl ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ εsec, where E is a quantum register that may
initially be correlated with D.
εsec in the above definition can be understood as the probability that some non-trivial information leaks
to the adversary [PR14].
If a protocol is εcorr-correct and εsec-secret (for a given D), then it is ε
s
QKD-correct-and-secret for any
εsQKD ≥ εcorr + εsec.
Definition 4 (Security). A DIQKD protocol is said to be (εsQKD, ε
c
QKD, l)-secure if:
1. (Soundness) For any implementation of the device D it is εsQKD-correct-and-secret.
2. (Completeness) There exists an honest implementation of the device D such that the protocol aborts
with probability at most εcQKD.
The protocols that we consider below take into account possible noise in the honest implementation. That
is, even when there is no adversary at all, the actual implementation of the devices might not be perfect.
Thus, the completeness of the protocol implies its robustness to the desired amount of noise.
Lastly, a remark regarding the composability of this security definition is in order. A security definition
is said to be composable [Can01, BOM04, PR14] if it implies that the protocol can be used arbitrarily and
composed with other protocols (proven secure by themselves), without compromising security. Obviously,
if Alice and Bob wish to use the keys they produced in the DIQKD protocol in some other cryptographic
protocol (i.e., they compose the two protocols), it is necessary for them to use protocols which were proven
to have composable security.
For the case of (device-dependent) QKD, Definition 4 was rigorously proven to be composable [PR14].
This suggests that the same security definition should also be the relevant one in the DI context and,
indeed, as far as we are aware, it is the definition that has been used in all prior works on DI cryptography.
Nevertheless, the claim that Definition 4 is composable for DI protocols as well has never been rigorously
proven, and the result of [BCK13] suggests that this is not the case when the same devices are reused in
the composition. We still use this definition as it seems like the most promising security definition to date.
This implies that, as in all other works, after the end of the protocol the device cannot be used again in
general [BCK13].
Randomness expansion. In the task of randomness expansion there is a single user interacting sequen-
tially with an untrusted device. At the start of the interaction the user is presented with a source R ∈ {0, 1}r
of uniformly random bits. The user then interacts sequentially with the device in a deterministic way (the
only sources of randomness being the initial string R and any randomness which may be present in the de-
vices’ outputs). At the end of the protocol the user returns a string Z ∈ {0, 1}m of m bits that is statistically
close to uniform, conditioned on R as well as any side information of the adversary. (See Section 6 for a
concrete example of a randomness expansion protocol.) More formally, we require the following.
Definition 5 (Security of randomness expansion). A protocol is called an (εcRE , ε
s
RE)-secure r → m ran-
domness expansion protocol12 if, provided as input r uniformly random bits:
1. (Soundness) For any implementation of the device D the protocol either aborts or returns a classical
string Z ∈ {0, 1}m and we have
(1− Pr[abort]) ‖ρZRE − ρUm ⊗ ρRE‖1 ≤ εsRE ,
where E is a quantum register that may initially be correlated with D.
2. (Completeness) There exists an honest implementation of the device such that the protocol aborts with
probability at most εcRE .
As in the case of DIQKD, this security definition was not proven to be composable in general.
12All parameters εc
RE
, εs
RE
, r and m will in general be function of a parameter n that also parametrises the protocol and the
number of rounds of interactions between the user and the device.
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2.6 The entropy accumulation theorem
The main tool used in this work is the EAT [DFR16, Theorem 4.4]. Below we give the necessary details in
a notation appropriate for our work (although less general than the original EAT).
We work with channels with the following properties:
Definition 6 (EAT channels). EAT channels Ni : Ri−1 → RiAiBiIiCi, for i ∈ [n], are CPTP maps such
that for all i ∈ [n]:
1. Ai, Bi, Ii and Ci are finite-dimensional classical systems (RV). Ai and Bi or of dimension dAi and dBi
respectively. Ri are arbitrary quantum registers.
2. For any input state σRi−1R′ , where R
′ is a register isomorphic to Ri−1, the output state σRiAiBiIiCiR′ =
(Ni ⊗ IR′)
(
σRi−1R′
)
has the property that the classical value Ci can be measured from the marginal
σAiBiIi without changing the state.
3. For any initial state ρ0R0E , the final state ρABICE = (TrRn ◦ Nn ◦ · · · ◦ N1)⊗ IE ρ0R0E fulfils the Markov
chain condition A1...i−1B1...i−1 ↔ I1...i−1E ↔ Ii for each i ∈ [n].
Definition 7 (Tradeoff functions). Let N1, . . . ,NN be a family of EAT channels. Let C denote the common
alphabet of C1, . . . , Cn. A differentiable and convex function fmin from the set of probability distributions p
over C to the real numbers is called a min-tradeoff function for {Ni} if it satisfies13
fmin(p) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=p
H (AiBi|IiR′)Ni(σ)
for all i ∈ [n], where the infimum is taken over all input states of Ni for which the marginal on Ci of the
output state is the probability distribution p.
Similarly, a differentiable and concave function fmax from the set of probability distributions p over C to
the real numbers is called a max-tradeoff function for {Ni} if it satisfies
fmax(p) ≥ sup
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=p
H (AiBi|IiR′)Ni(σ)
for all i ∈ [n], where the supremum is taken over all input states of Ni for which the marginal on Ci of the
output state is the probability distribution p.
Theorem 8 (EAT [DFR16]). Let Ni : Ri−1 → RiAiBiIiCi for i ∈ [n] be EAT channels as in Definition 6,
ρABICE = (TrRn ◦ Nn ◦ · · · ◦ N1)⊗ IE ρR0E be the final state, Ω an event defined over Cn, pΩ the probability
of Ω in ρ, and ρ|Ω the final state conditioned on Ω. Let εs ∈ (0, 1).
For fmin a min-tradeoff function for {Ni}, as in Definition 7, and any t ∈ R such that fmin (freqc) ≥ t
for any c ∈ Cn for which Pr [c]ρ|Ω > 0,
Hεsmin (AB|IE)ρ|Ω > nt− v
√
n ,
where v = 2 (log(1 + 2dAiBi) + ⌈‖▽fmin‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(εs · pΩ) and dAiBi denotes the dimension of AiBi.
Similarly, for fmax a max-tradeoff function for {Ni} as in Definition 7 and any t ∈ R such that
fmax (freqc) ≤ t for any c ∈ Cn for which Pr [c]ρ|Ω > 0,
Hεsmax (AB|IE)ρ|Ω < nt+ v
√
n ,
where v = 2 (log(1 + 2dAiBi) + ⌈‖▽fmax‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(εs · pΩ).
13The infimum and supremum over the empty set are defined as plus and minus infinity, respectively.
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To gain a bit of intuition on how Theorem 8 is going to be used note the following. The event Ω will
usually be the event of the considered protocol not aborting (or a closely related event). The relevant state
for which the smooth min- or max-entropy is going to be evaluated is ρ|Ω. To use the theorem, it should
be possible to define some EAT channels {Ni} that produce the final state ρ from the initial state ρR0 by
applying the channels sequentially; these channels are not necessarily the channels used in the actual protocol
to produce ρ. The tradeoff functions can be seen as a bound on the entropy accumulated in one round i,
and, if such a bound t exists, then Theorem 8 asserts that the total amount of entropy, accumulated in all
rounds i = 1 to n together, is roughly n times t. It is in this sense that the theorem essentially allows us to
perform a reduction to the i.i.d. setting.
3 Device-independent entropy accumulation protocol
The main task in proving security of DIQKD and other protocols is to prove a bound on the (smooth) min-
entropy of the raw data held by Alice and Bob, conditioned on all the information available to the adversary
Eve. The goal of this section is to show how the EAT (Theorem 8) can be used in a general DI setting to
achieve such a bound.
For this we consider the entropy accumulation protocol, described as Protocol 1 below. Although we call
it a “protocol”, one should see it more as a mathematical tool which allows us to use the EAT rather than
an actual protocol to be implemented.14 To be more specific, the EAT channels (as in Definition 6) will be
defined via the steps made in the entropy accumulation protocol. The relevance of the protocol stems from
the fact that the final state at the end of the protocol, on which a smooth min-entropy bound can be proven
using the EAT, is the same state as (or can easily be related to) the final state in the actual protocol to be
executed (depending on the specific application).
3.1 The protocol
Protocol 1 is used to generate raw data for Alice and Bob by using an untrusted device D. It is based on an
arbitrary non-local game G as defined in Section 2.3, together with a definition of test and generation inputs
for Alice and Bob. The test inputs, Xt ⊂ X and Yt ⊂ Y, are used by the parties during the test rounds
(Ti = 1 below) from which the Bell violation is estimated, while the generation inputs, Xg ⊂ X and Yg ⊂ Y,
are used in the other rounds (the sets are not necessarily disjoint). We also assume that Xg ⊂ Xt, as it is
important that, given a value in Xg, the device is not able to infer the value of Ti. Ideally, one should use a
game G for which Alice and Bob’s outputs are perfectly correlated (or anti-correlated) with sufficiently high
probability when the parties use the generation inputs.15
We now define the EAT channels using the rounds of the protocol (where one round includes Steps 2-6
in Protocol 1). For this, the following notation is used. For every i ∈ {0} ∪ [n], the (unknown) quantum
state of the device D shared by Alice and Bob after round i of the protocol is denoted by ρiQAQB . We denote
the register holding this state by Ri. In particular, R0 ≡ QAQB at the start of the protocol. At Step 4
in Protocol 1, the quantum state of the devices is changed from ρi−1QAQB in Ri−1 to ρ
i
QAQB
in Ri by the
use of the device.16 Our EAT channels are then Ni : Ri−1 → RiAiBiXiYiTiCi defined by the CPTP map
describing the i-th round of Protocol 1, as implemented by the untrusted device D (see Figure 1). We prove
in Lemma 10 below that they indeed satisfy the conditions given in Definition 6.
14In particular, in a setting with two distinct parties, Alice and Bob, communication is required to actually implement it.
We ignore this here as it is not relevant for the analysis.
15In a DIQKD protocol (or other tasks with two separated honest parties) this requirement is used to ensure a good key
rate, as the output bits in the generation rounds will be the main contributors to the final key. For tasks such as randomness
expansion, where there is only one honest party, it is not necessary to generate matching outputs.
16To be a bit more precise, the quantum state is changed in two steps. First, the relevant measurement of Step 4 is done
(where it is assumed that the measurements of the different components are in tensor product). Then, after Ai and Bi are
recorded, the different components of the device are allowed to communicate. Thus, some further changes can be made to the
post-measurement state even based on the memory of all components together.
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Protocol 1 Entropy accumulation protocol
Arguments:
G – two-player non-local game
Xg ⊂ Xt ⊂ X – generation and test inputs for Alice
Yg,Yt ⊂ Y – generation and test inputs for Bob
D – untrusted device of (at least) two components that can play G repeatedly
n ∈ N+ – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] – expected fraction of test rounds
ωexp – expected winning probability in G for an honest (perhaps noisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the statistical confidence interval for the estimation test
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-6:
2: Alice chooses Ti ∈ {0, 1} at random such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ, and sends her choice of Ti to Bob over
a public authenticated classical channel.
3: If Ti = 0 Alice and Bob choose inputs Xi ∈ Xg and Yi ∈ Yg respectively. If Ti = 1 they choose inputs
Xi ∈ Xt and Yi ∈ Yt.
4: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and Bi respectively.
5: (Optional symmetrisation step:) Alice and Bob choose together a (random) value Fi, and respectively
update their outputs Ai, Bi depending on Fi.
6: If Ti = 0 then Bob updates Bi to Bi =⊥, and they set Ci =⊥. If Ti = 1 they set Ci = w (Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi).
7: Alice and Bob abort if
∑
i Ci < (ωexpγ − δest) · n .
R0
E
ρ0QAQBE
R1
O1
N1
ρ1QAQB
R2
O2
N2
ρ2QAQB
Ri−1 Ri
Oi
Ni
ρi−1
QAQB
ρiQAQB
Rn−1 Rn
On
Nn
ρn−1
QAQB
ρnQAQB
Figure 1: The EAT channels Ni : Ri−1 → RiAiBiXiYiTiCi. In the figure, Oi = AiBiXiYiTiCi. The initial
quantum state shared by Alice, Bob, and Eve is ρ0QAQBE and the sequence of maps Ni creates the state
ρnQAQBEO.
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In the following we are interested in the state of Alice, Bob, and Eve after the n-th round of the protocol,
both before and after Alice and Bob decide whether to abort or not in Step 7. The state before Step 7 is
denoted by
ρABXYTCE = (TrRn ◦ Nn ◦ · · · ◦ N1)⊗ IE ρ0QAQBE . (2)
In Step 7 Alice and Bob decide whether they should abort the protocol or not according to the estimated
Bell violation in the test rounds. Let Ω denote the event that they do not abort17, i.e.,
Ω =
{∑
j
Cj ≥ (ωexpγ − δest) · n
}
. (3)
The final state, conditioned on not aborting, is denoted by ρABXYTCE|Ω or just ρ|Ω to ease notation.
Below we bound the entropy which is accumulated in this state during the rounds of the protocol.
3.2 Completeness
Suppose that Alice and Bob execute Protocol 1 with a device D which performs i.i.d. measurements on a
tensor product state ρ⊗nQAQB such that the winning probability achieved in game G by the device D executed
on a single state ρQAQB is ωexp. We call any such implementation an honest implementation. The following
lemma bounds the probability of Protocol 1 aborting in an honest implementation.
Lemma 9. Protocol 1 is complete with completeness error εcEA ≤ exp(−2nδ2est). That is, the probability that
the protocol aborts for an honest implementation of the devices D is at most εcEA.
Proof. Alice and Bob abort in Step 7 when the sum of the Ci is not sufficiently high (this happens when the
estimated Bell violation is too low or when not enough test rounds were chosen). In the honest implemen-
tation Ci are i.i.d. RVs with E [Ci] = ωexpγ. Therefore, we can use Hoeffding’s inequality:
εcEA = Pr

∑
j
Cj ≥ (ωexpγ − δest) · n

 ≤ exp(−2nδ2est) . (4)
3.3 Soundness
The EAT, Theorem 8, almost immediately provides a general lower bound on the amount of entropy generated
by Protocol 1. We state the result as Lemma 10 below; in Section 4 we will obtain a more refined bound
based on an instantiation of the protocol with the game G taken to be the CHSH game.
Lemma 10. Let D be any device, and for i ∈ [n] let Ii = XiYiTiFi and Ni : Ri−1 → RiAiBiIiCi the
CPTP map implemented by the i-th round of Protocol 1. Let ρ be the state generated by the protocol (as
defined in Equation (2)), Ω the event that the protocol does not abort (as defined in Equation (3)), and ρ|Ω
the state conditioned on Ω. Let fmin be a real-valued differentiable function defined on the set of probability
distributions p over the alphabet {⊥, 0, 1} of Ci such that
∀i ∈ [n] fmin(p) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=p
H (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) , (5)
where the infimum over an empty set is defined as infinity. Then, for any εEA, εs ∈ (0, 1), either the protocol
aborts with probability 1− Pr(Ω) ≥ 1− εEA or,
Hεsmin (AB|XYTFE)ρ|Ω > nt− v
√
n, (6)
17Note that Cj ∈ {0, 1,⊥}; the quantity
∑
j Cj should be understood as
∑
j|Cj=1
1.
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where
t = min
p: p(1)≥ωexpγ−δest
fmin(p) ,
v = 2 (log(1 + 2dAiBi) + ⌈‖▽fmin‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(εs · εEA)
and dAiBi denotes the dimension of AiBi.
Proof. In order to apply the EAT we first verify that the conditions stated in Definition 6 are fulfilled. Using
that Ci is a function of Ai, Bi, Xi, and Yi the first two conditions in Definition 6 clearly hold. Moreover, the
Markov chain condition
∀i ∈ [n], A1...iB1...i ↔ X1...iY1...iT1...iF1...iE ↔ Xi+1Yi+1Ti+1Fi+1
holds as well since the values of Xi+1, Yi+1, Ti+1, and Fi+1 are chosen independently of everything else at
each round. To conclude, note the event Ω of the protocol not aborting implies that the fraction of successful
game rounds freqc(1) is at least ωexpγ − δest for any c for which Pr [c]ρ|Ω > 0.
The main work remaining for a successful use of Protocol 1 for entropy generation consists in obtaining
a good lower bound in Equation (6), i.e., devising an appropriate min-tradeoff function fmin satisfying
Equation (5). In order to understand the task to be accomplished note that Ni defines Xi, Yi, Ti, and Fi,
so although the infimum in Equation (5) is taken over all states σ the distributions of Xi, Yi, Ti, and Fi are
fixed. Moreover, the infimum is only taken over states with Ni(σ)Ci = p, a condition which fixes the Bell
violation achieved by σ under the bipartite measurement performed by the device. This is precisely the sense
in which the EAT can be understood as providing a reduction to the i.i.d. case.
Lower bounds of the form of Equation (5) of different quality can be obtained depending on the specific
Bell inequality employed in the protocol. A general method consists in using the chain rule to write
H (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) = H (Ai|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) +H (Bi|XiYiTiFiR′Ai)Ni(σ) (7)
≥ Hmin (Ai|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ)
Note that here the random variable Fi depends on the (optional) symmetrisation step, and was introduced
precisely to enable an easier lower bound on the quantities above; we will show how it can be used in the
specific case of the CHSH game in the next section.
A bound using the min-entropyHmin, instead ofH itself, is not tight in general, and one can expect to lose
quite a lot by performing the relaxation above (see for example Figure 2). The advantage, however, is that a
lower bound on Hmin (Ai|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) can be found using general techniques based on the semidefinite
programming (SDP) hierarchies of [NPA08]. For a slightly better bound one should not drop the second term
in Equation (7). A bound on Hmin (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) (usually called “global randomness”) can also
be found using the SDP hierarchies (see, e.g., [PAM+10]). For further details and references see [BCP+14,
Section IV-C].
4 A bound for the CHSH game
In this section we devise a specific min-tradeoff function fmin which, through an application of Lemma 10,
leads to a concrete bound on the entropy generated by Protocol 1 when the game G is the CHSH game
(described in Section 2.3).
We use Protocol 1 with the following choices: Xg = {0}, Xt = {0, 1}, Yg = {2}, and Yt = {0, 1}.
In order to fully specify the protocol it suffices to describe the symmetrisation step. In this step, Alice
and Bob choose together a uniform bit Fi, and they both flip their output bits if and only if Fi = 1. This
symmetrisation is helpful in the proof of the main theorem below. The downside is that it costs a lot of
randomness to implement, which can be problematic for some applications such as randomness expansion.
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Figure 2: The lower bounds on H
(
Ai|XiYiTiR′i−1
)
and Hmin
(
Ai|XiYiTiR′i−1
)
as a function of the Bell
violation for the CHSH inequality. The bound on H
(
Ai|XiYiTiR′i−1
)
is given in Equation (14) while the
bound on Hmin
(
Ai|XiYiTiR′i−1
)
can be taken from [MPA11]; both bounds are asymptotically tight. For
non-optimal Bell violation the min-entropy is significantly lower than the entropy.
At the end of the section we show that the step is in fact not necessary in any real implementation of the
protocol.
The proof of Theorem 11 shows that the rate of entropy generation is governed by the following functions,
where h is the binary entropy and γ, p(1) ∈ (0, 1] such that p(1)/γ ≥ 3/4:18
g(p) =


1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p(1)γ
(
p(1)
γ − 1
)
+ 3
)
p(1)
γ ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
1 p(1)γ ∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
]
,
fmin (p, pt) =
{
g (p) p(1) ≤ pt(1)
d
dp(1)g(p)
∣∣
pt
· p(1) +
(
g(pt)− ddp(1)g(p)
∣∣
pt
· pt(1)
)
p(1) > pt(1) ,
η(p, pt, εs, εe) = fmin (p, pt)− 1√
n
2
(
log 13 +
⌈ d
dp(1)
g(p)
∣∣
pt
⌉)√
1− 2 log(εs · εe) ,
ηopt(εs, εe) = max
3
4<
pt(1)
γ
< 2+
√
2
4
η(ωexpγ − δest, pt, εs, εe) . (8)
Theorem 11 (Main theorem). Let D be any device, ρ the state (as defined in Equation (2)) generated using
Protocol 1 when the game G is the CHSH game, Ω (as defined in Equation (3)) the event that the protocol
does not abort, and ρ|Ω the state conditioned on Ω. Then, for any εEA, εs ∈ (0, 1), either the protocol aborts
with probability greater than 1− εEA or
Hεsmin (AB|XYTFE)ρ|Ω > n · ηopt(εs, εEA) , (9)
where ηopt is defined in Equation (8).
The rate ηopt as a function of the expected Bell violation ωexp is plotted in Figure 3 for γ = 1 and several
choices of values for εEA, δest, and n. For comparison, we also plot in Figure 3 the asymptotic rate (n→∞)
18We define the functions g and fmin only in the regime in which the protocol does not abort, i.e., p(1)/γ ≥ 3/4. Any
extension of g to the regime p(1)/γ ∈ [0, 3/4] that keeps the function differential can be used for mathematical completeness.
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Figure 3: ηopt(ωexp) for γ = 1 and several choices of δest, n, εEA, and the smoothing parameter εs. Note
that for the errors of the protocols to be meaningful the number of rounds n should be at least of order δ−2est .
εEA and εs affect the soundness error in the protocols of the following sections. The dashed line shows the
optimal asymptotic (n→∞) rate under the assumption that the devices are such that Alice, Bob, and Eve
share an (unknown) i.i.d. state.
under the assumption that the state of the device is an (unknown) i.i.d. state ρ⊗nQAQBE . In this case, the
quantum asymptotic equipartition property [TCR09, Theorems 1 and 9] implies that the optimal rate is the
Shannon entropy accumulated in one round of the protocol (as given in Equation (14)). This rate, appearing
as the dashed line in Figure 3, is an upper bound on the entropy that can be accumulated. One can see that
as the number of rounds in the protocol increases our rate ηopt approaches this optimal rate.
Proof of Theorem 11. Based on Lemma 10, it will suffice to define a min-tradeoff function fmin such that
Equation (5) is satisfied. Using the chain rule,
H (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) ≥ H (Ai|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) .
Furthermore,
H (Ai|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) = Pr [Xi = 0] ·H (Ai|YiTiFiR′, Xi = 0)Ni(σ)
+ Pr [Xi = 1] ·H (Ai|YiTiFiR′, Xi = 1)Ni(σ) .
(10)
In the following we find a bound on H (Ai|YiTiFiR′, Xi = 0)Ni(σ). Using exactly the same steps the same
bound can be derived on H (Ai|YiTiFiR′, Xi = 1)Ni(σ).
Due to the bipartite requirement on the untrusted device D used to implement the protocol and since
Alice’s actions (and her device’s) are independent of Bob’s choice of Yi and Ti for the case Xi = 0 we have
19
H (Ai|YiTiFiR′, Xi = 0)Ni(σ) = H (Ai|FiR′, Xi = 0)Ni(σ) .
19We assume that the value of Ti is exchanged over a classical authenticated channel to which the device D does not have
access. In particular, Alice’s part of the device is independent from the value of Ti.
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Using the definition of the conditional entropy one can rewrite H (Ai|FiR′, Xi = 0)Ni(σ) as follows:
H (Ai|FiR′, Xi = 0) = H (AiFiR′|Xi = 0)−H (FiR′|Xi = 0)
= H (Ai|Xi = 0) +H (FiR′|Ai, Xi = 0)−H (FiR′|Xi = 0)
= H (Ai|Xi = 0)− χ (Ai : FiR′|Xi = 0)
= 1− χ (Ai : FiR′|Xi = 0) , (11)
where χ (Ai : FiR
′|Xi = 0) = H (FiR′|Xi = 0)−H (FiR′|Ai, Xi = 0) and the last equality follows from the
symmetrisation step, Step 5.
For states leading to a CHSH violation of β ∈ [2, 2√2] (for inputs restricted to {0, 1} × {0, 1}) a tight
bound on χ (Ai : FiR
′|Xi = 0) was derived in [PAB+09, Section 2.3]:
χ (Ai : FiR
′|Xi = 0) ≤ h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
β2
4
− 1
)
. (12)
Since ω = 18β +
1
2 , for ω ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
(i.e. a violation in the quantum regime) we get
χ (Ai : FiR
′|Xi = 0) ≤ h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω (ω − 1) + 3
)
.
Combining this bound with Equations (10) and (11) we conclude that for a state with winning probability ω,
H (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′) ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω (ω − 1) + 3
)
. (13)
Consider a probability distribution p = freqc resulting from the observed data. If p(0) + p(1) 6= γ then
the set of states fulfilling Ni(σ)Ci = p is empty and the condition on the min-tradeoff function given in
Definition 7 becomes trivial. Hence, for the construction of the min-tradeoff function we can restrict our
attention to p with p(0) + p(1) = γ. For such p we can write ω = p(1)p(0)+p(1) =
p(1)
γ . All together we have for
all p in the considered regime,
inf
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=p
H (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16
p(1)
γ
(
p(1)
γ
− 1
)
+ 3
)
. (14)
Define a function g over p for which p(2)/γ ∈ [3/54, 1] by
g(p) =


1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p(1)γ
(
p(1)
γ − 1
)
+ 3
)
p(1)
γ ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
1 p(1)γ ∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
]
.
(15)
From Equation (14) it follows that any choice of fmin(p) that is differentiable and satisfies fmin(p) ≤ g(p)
for all p will satisfy Equation (5).
For p(1)γ =
2+
√
2
4 the derivative of g is infinite. For the final bound of the EAT to be meaningful fmin
should be chosen such that ‖▽fmin‖∞ is finite. To remedy this problem we choose fmin by “cutting” the
function g and “gluing” it to a linear function at some point pt (which is later optimised), while keeping the
function differentiable. By doing this we ensure that the gradient of fmin is bounded, at the cost of losing a
bit of entropy for p with p(1) > pt(1). Towards this, denote
a(pt) =
⌈ d
dp(1)
g(p)
∣∣
pt
⌉
and b(pt) = g(pt)− a(pt) · pt(1). (16)
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pt(1)
0
1
p(1)
H
Tangent line at pt(1)
fmin
Figure 4: The construction of the min-tradeoff function fmin as in Equation (17). The plot shows the values
of the min-tradeoff function on a slice p(0) + p(1) = constant.
We then make the following choice20 for the min-tradeoff function fmin (see Figure 4):
fmin (p, pt) =
{
g (p) p(1) ≤ pt(1)
a(pt) · p(1) + b(pt) p(1) > pt(1)
(17)
From the definition of a and b in Equation (16) this function is differentiable and fulfils the condition given
in Equation (5). Furthermore, by definition for any choice of pt it holds that ‖▽fmin(·, pt)‖∞ ≤ a(pt).
Applying Lemma 10, we conclude that for any 34 <
pt(1)
γ <
2+
√
2
4 , either the protocol aborts with
probability greater than 1− εEA, or
Hεsmin (AB|XYTFE)ρ|Ω > nfmin (ωexpγ − δest, pt)−
√
nζ(pt) , (18)
for ζ(pt, εs, εAE) = 2 (log 13 + a(pt))
√
1− 2 log(εs · εAE) (as dAiBi = 6). To obtain the optimal rate we
optimise over pt . Denote η(p, pt, εs, εAE) = fmin (p, pt)− 1√nζ(pt, εs, εAE) and let
ηopt(εs, εAE) = max
3
4<
pt(1)
γ
< 2+
√
2
4
η(ωexpγ − δest, pt, εs, εAE) .
Plugging this into Equation (18) the theorem follows.
We end this section by showing how the particular implementation of the symmetrisation step, Step 5,
of Protocol 1 made here for the CHSH game can be ignored in any implementation of the protocol. For this,
rewrite Equation (9) more formally as21
Hεsmin (gF (AB) |XYTFE)ρ|Ω > n · ηopt , (19)
where gF is the function that flips the bits according to F. Since for any fixed value of F , gF is a deterministic
function it follows from [SR08b, Lemma 1] that for any εs ≥ 0,
Hεsmin (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ω ≥ H
εs
min (gF (AB) |XYTFE)ρ|Ω . (20)
20Note that fmin is nonpositive for
p(1)
γ
≤ 3/4, but this regime is not relevant as it would lead to the protocol aborting; the
extension of fmin to that range of values is only for mathematical convenience.
21Previously for ease of notation we wrote AB for the flipped outputs; here we denote the same bits as gF (AB) to make the
flipping operation explicit.
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Combining Equations (19) and (20) proves the following corollary.
Corollary 12. Under the same assumptions as Theorem 11, but for an implementation of Protocol 1 in
which the symmetrisation step, Step 5, is omitted, for any εEA, εs ∈ (0, 1), either the protocol aborts with
probability greater than 1− εEA or
Hεsmin (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ω > n · ηopt(εs, εEA) , (21)
where ηopt is defined in Equation (8).
In Appendix B we use a small modification of the entropy accumulation protocol and the above proof to
get a similar bound on the entropy rate which has a better dependency on the probability of a test γ. This
is of relevance for some applications such as DIQKD. The calculations presented in Appendix B are slightly
more technical than the proof given above, but do not require any substantially different observations.
5 DIQKD
5.1 The protocol
Our protocol for DIQKD is described as Protocol 2 below. An honest implementation is described in
Section 5.2.
In the first part of the protocol Alice and Bob use their devices to produce the raw data, similarly to
what is done in the entropy accumulation protocol, Protocol 1 (with the game G equal to the CHSH game,
as in Section 4). The main difference is that Bob’s outputs always contains Bob’s i-th measurement outcome
(instead of being set to ⊥ in all rounds for which Ti = 0); to make the distinction explicit we denote Bob’s
outputs in Protocol 2 with a tilde, B˜.
In the second part of the protocol Alice and Bob apply classical post-processing steps to produce their
final keys. We choose classical post-processing steps that optimise the key rate, but which may not be
optimal in other aspects, e.g., computation time. The protocol and the analysis can easily be adapted for
other choices of classical post-processing.
We now describe the three post-processing steps, error correction, parameter estimation and privacy
amplification, in detail.22
Error correction. Alice and Bob use an error correction protocol EC to obtain identical raw keys KA and
KB from their bits A, B˜. In our analysis we use a protocol, based on universal hashing, which minimises
the amount of leakage to the adversary [BS93, RW05] (see also Section 3.3.2 in [Bea15] for details). To
implement this protocol Alice chooses a hash function and sends the chosen function and the hashed value
of her bits to Bob. We denote this classical communication by O. Bob uses O, together with his prior
knowledge B˜XYT, to compute a guess Aˆ for Alice’s bits A. If EC raises a “fail” flag Alice and Bob abort;
in an honest implementation this happens with probability at most εcEC. The probability that Alice and Bob
do not abort but hold different raw keys KA = A and KB = Aˆ 6= KA is at most εEC.
Due to the communication from Alice to Bob leakEC bits of information are leaked to the adversary. The
following guarantee follows for the described protocol [RW05]:
leakEC ≤ Hε
′
EC
0
(
A|B˜XYT
)
+ log
(
1
εEC
)
, (22)
for εcEC = ε
′
EC + εEC and where H
ε′EC
0 (A|B˜XYT) is evaluated on the state in an honest implementation
of the protocol. For example, for quantum channels with an i.i.d. noise model H
ε′EC
0
(
A|B˜XYT
)
can be
22We remark that in Step 2 of Protocol 2 Alice and Bob choose Ti together (or exchange its value between them) in every
round of the protocol and choose their inputs accordingly. This is in contrast to choosing Alice and Bob’s input from a product
distribution and then adding a sifting step, as usually done in QKD protocols. It follows from our proof technique that making
Ti public as we do does not compromise the security of the protocol.
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bounded by above using the asymptotic equipartition property [TCR09] (see Equation (30) below for the
explicit bound in that case). If a larger fraction of errors occur when running the actual DIQKD protocol
(for instance due to adversarial interference) the error correction might not succeed, as Bob will not have
a sufficient amount of information to obtain a good guess of Alice’s bits. If so this will be detected with
probability at least 1− εEC and the protocol will abort.
Parameter estimation. After the error correction step, Bob has all of the relevant information to perform
parameter estimation from his data alone, without any further communication with Alice. Using B˜ and KB,
Bob sets Ci = wCHSH
(
Aˆi, B˜i, Xi, Yi
)
= wCHSH
(
KBi, B˜i, Xi, Yi
)
for the test rounds and Ci =⊥ otherwise.
He aborts if the fraction of successful game rounds is too low, that is, if
∑
j Cj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n .
As Bob does the estimation using his guess of Alice’s bits, the probability of aborting in this step in an
honest implementation, εcPE, is bounded by
εcPE ≤ Pr
(∑
j
Cj < (ωexpγ − δest) ·
∑
j
Tj
∣∣∣KA = KB)+ Pr (KA 6= KB and EC does not abort)
≤ εcEA + εEC , (23)
since conditioned on the error correction protocol succeeding the probability of aborting in the honest case
is exactly as in the entropy accumulation protocol (Protocol 1).
Privacy amplification. Finally, Alice and Bob use a (quantum-proof) privacy amplification protocol PA
(which takes some random seed S as input) to create their final keys K˜A and K˜B of length ℓ, which are close
to ideal keys, i.e., uniformly random and independent of the adversary’s knowledge.
For simplicity we use universal hashing [RK05] as the privacy amplification protocol in the analysis below.
Any other quantum-proof strong extractor, e.g., Trevisan’s extractor [DPVR12], can be used for this task
and the analysis can be easily adapted.
The secrecy of the final key depends only on the privacy amplification protocol used and the value of
Hεsmin(A|XYTOE), evaluated on the state at the end of the protocol, conditioned on not aborting. For
universal hashing, for every εPA, εs ∈ (0, 1) a secure key of maximal length
ℓ = Hεsmin(A|XYTOE)− 2 log
1
εPA
(24)
is produced with probability23 at least 1− εPA − εs.
The main theorem of this section is the following security result for Protocol 2:
Theorem 13. The DIQKD protocol given in Protocol 2 is (εsQKD, ε
c
QKD, ℓ)-secure according to Definition 4,
with εsQKD ≤ εEC + εPA + εs + εEA, εcQKD ≤ εcEC + εcEA + εEC, and
ℓ = n · ηopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
−γn−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC))− 2 log
(
ε−1PA
)
,
(25)
where ηopt is specified in Equation (8).
In Section 5.5 we plot the resulting key rates, ℓ/n, for different choices of parameters.
Theorem 13 follows by combining Lemmas 14 and 16 that we prove in the following sections.
23εPA is the error probability of the extractor when it is applied on a normalised state satisfying the relevant min-entropy
bound. For universal hashing, when only a bound on the smooth min-entropy is given the smoothing parameter εs should
be added to the error εPA. When working with other extractors one should adapt the parameters accordingly; see [AFPS15,
Section 4.3].
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Protocol 2 CHSH-based DIQKD protocol
Arguments:
D – untrusted device of two components that can play CHSH repeatedly
n ∈ N+ – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] – expected fraction of test rounds
ωexp – expected winning probability in an honest (perhaps noisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the statistical confidence interval for the estimation test
EC – error correction protocol which leaks leakEC bits and has error probability εEC
PA – privacy amplification protocol with error probability εPA
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-4:
2: Alice and Bob choose a random Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
3: If Ti = 0 Alice and Bob choose (Xi, Yi) = (0, 2) and otherwise Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
4: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and B˜i respectively.
5: Error correction: Alice and Bob apply the error correction protocol EC, communicating O in the
process. If EC aborts they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they obtain raw keys denoted by KA and KB.
6: Parameter estimation: Using B˜ and KB, Bob sets Ci = wCHSH
(
KBi, B˜i, Xi, Yi
)
for the test rounds
and Ci =⊥ otherwise. He aborts if
∑
j Cj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n;.
7: Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob apply the privacy amplification protocol PA on KA and KB to
create their final keys K˜A and K˜B of length ℓ as defined in Equation (25).
5.2 The honest implementation
The honest (but possibly noisy) implementation of the protocol is one where the device D performs in every
round i of the protocol the measurements Maixi ⊗Mbiyi on Alice and Bob’s state ρQAQB . The state and
measurements are such that the winning probability achieved in the CHSH game in a single round is ωexp.
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For the measurements (Xi, Yi) = (0, 2) we denote the quantum bit error rate, i.e., the probability that
Ai 6= Bi while using these measurements, by Q. Thus, in the honest case we assume the device D behaves
in an i.i.d. manner (and in particular an i.i.d. noise model for the quantum channels used in the protocol):
it is initialised in an i.i.d. bipartite state, ρ⊗nQAQB , on which it makes i.i.d. measurements.
As an example, one possible realisation of such an implementation is the following. Alice and Bob share
the two-qubit Werner state ρQAQB = (1−ν) |φ+〉 〈φ+|+νI/4 for |Φ+〉 = 1/
√
2 (|00〉+ |11〉) and ν ∈ [0, 1]. The
state ρQAQB arises, e.g., from the state |Φ+〉 after going through a depolarisation channel. For every i ∈ [n],
Alice’s measurements Xi = 0 and Xi = 1 correspond to σz and σx respectively and Bob’s measurements
Yi = 0, Yi = 1, and Yi = 2 to
σz+σx√
2
, σz−σx√
2
and σz respectively. The winning probability in the CHSH game
(restricted to Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1}) using these measurements on ρQAQB is ωexp = 2+
√
2(1−ν)
4 and Q =
ν
2 .
5.3 Completeness
The completeness of the protocol follows from the honest i.i.d. implementation described in Section 5.2 and
the completeness of the entropy accumulation protocol as shown in Section 3.2.
Lemma 14. Protocol 2 is complete with completeness error εcQKD ≤ εcEC+εcEA+εEC. That is, the probability
that the protocol aborts for an honest implementation of the device D is at most εcQKD.
Proof. There are two steps at which Protocol 2 may abort: after the error correction (Step 5) or in the
Bell violation estimation (Step 6). By the union bound, the total probability of aborting is at most the
24Note that in our notation, the noise that affects the winning probability in the CHSH game is already included in ωexp.
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probability of aborting in each of these steps. Using this and Equation (23) we get:
εcQKD ≤ εcEC + εcPE ≤ εcEC + εcEA + εEC .
5.4 Soundness
To establish soundness, first note that by definition, as long as the protocol does not abort it produces a
key of length ℓ. Therefore it remains to verify correctness, which depends on the error correction step, and
security, which is based on the privacy amplification step. To prove security we start with Lemma 15, in
which we assume that the error correction step is successful. We then use it to prove soundness in Lemma 16.
Let Ω˜ denote the event of Protocol 2 not aborting and the EC protocol being successful, and let
ρ˜AB˜XYTOE|Ω˜ be the state at the end of the protocol, conditioned on this event.
Success of the privacy amplification step relies on the min-entropyHεsmin(A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ being sufficiently
large. The following lemma connects this quantity to H
εs
4
min(AB|XYTE)ρ|Ω , on which a lower bound is
provided by Corollary 12.
Lemma 15. For any device D, let ρ˜ be the state generated in Protocol 2 right before the privacy amplification
step, Step 7. Let ρ˜|Ω˜ be the state conditioned on not aborting the protocol and success of the EC protocol.
Then, for any εEA, εEC, εs ∈ (0, 1), either the protocol aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA − εEC or
Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥ n · ηopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
−γn−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) .
(26)
Proof. Consider the following events:
1. Ω: the event of not aborting in the entropy accumulation protocol, Protocol 1. This happens when the
Bell violation, calculated using Alice and Bob’s outputs (and inputs), is sufficiently high.
2. Ωˆ: Suppose Alice and Bob run Protocol 1, and then execute the EC protocol. The event Ωˆ is defined
by Ω and KB = A.
3. Ω˜: the event of not aborting the DIQKD protocol, Protocol 2, and KB = A.
The state ρ|Ωˆ then denotes the state at the end of Protocol 1 conditioned on Ωˆ.
As we are only interested in the case where the EC protocol outputs the correct guess of Alice’s bits,
that is KB = A (which happens with probability 1− εEC), we have ρ˜AXYTE|Ω˜ = ρAXYTE|Ωˆ (note B˜ and B
were traced out from ρ˜ and ρ respectively). Hence,
Hεsmin (A|XYTE)ρ˜|Ω˜ = H
εs
min (A|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ . (27)
Using the chain rule given in [Tom15, Lemma 6.8] together with Equation (27) we get that
Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥ H
εs
min (A|XYTE)ρ˜|Ω˜ − leakEC
= Hεsmin (A|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ − leakEC . (28)
To apply Corollary 12 it remains to relate Hεsmin (A|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ to H
ε′s
min (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ for some ε
′
s. For
this we first write
Hεsmin (A|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ ≥ H
εs
4
min (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ −H
εs
4
max (B|AXYTE)ρ|Ωˆ − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
≥ H
εs
4
min (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ −H
εs
4
max (B|TE)ρ|Ωˆ − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
,
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where the first inequality is due to the chain rule [Tom15, Equation (6.57)] and the second is due to strong
sub-additivity of the smooth max-entropy.
One can now apply the EAT to upper bound H
εs
4
max (B|TE)ρ|Ωˆ in the following way. We use Theorem 8
with the replacements AB→ B, I→ T, E → E. The Markov conditions B1,...,i−1 ↔ T1,...,i−1E ↔ Ti then
trivially hold and the condition on the max-tradeoff function reads
fmax(p) ≥ sup
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)
H (Bi|TiR′)Ni(σ) .
By the definition of the EAT channels {Ni}, Bi 6=⊥ only for Ti = 1, which happens with probability γ.
Hence, for any state σRi−1R′ we have,
H (Bi|TiR′)Ni(σ) ≤ H (Bi|Ti)Ni(σ) ≤ γ
and the max-tradeoff function is simply fmax(p) = γ for any p (and thus ‖▽fmax‖∞ = 0). Applying25
Theorem 8 with this choice of fmax we get
H
εs
4
max (B|TE)ρ|Ωˆ < γn+
√
n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) . (29)
Combining Equation (28) with the above inequalities we get that
Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥ H
εs
4
min (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ − leakEC − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
−γn−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) .
Finally, note that by applying the EAT on ρ|Ωˆ, as in Corollary 12, we have that either 1 − Pr(Ωˆ) ≥
1− εEA − εEC, or
H
εs
4
min(AB|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ > n · ηopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC) .
The last two equations together give us the desired bound on Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ : either the protocol
aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA − εEC or
Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥ n · ηopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
−γn−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) .
Using Lemma 15, we prove that Protocol 2 is sound.
Lemma 16. For any device D let ρ˜ be the state generated using Protocol 2. Then either the protocol aborts
with probability greater than 1− εEA − εEC or it is (εEC + εPA+ εs)-correct-and-secret while producing keys
of length ℓ, as defined in Equation (25).
Proof. Denote all the classical public communication during the protocol by J = XYTOS where S is the
seed used in the privacy amplification protocol PA. Let
≈
Ω denote the event of not aborting Protocol 2 and
ρ˜
K˜AK˜BJE|
≈
Ω
be the final state of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of the protocol, conditioned on not aborting.
We consider two cases. First assume that the EC protocol was not successful (but did not abort). Then
Alice and Bob’s final keys might not be identical. This happens with probability at most εEC.
Otherwise, assume the EC protocol was successful, i.e., KB = A. In that case, Alice and Bob’s keys must
be identical also after the final privacy amplification step. That is, conditioned on KB = A, K˜A = K˜B.
We continue to show that in this case the key is also secret. The secrecy depends only on the privacy
amplification step, and for universal hashing a secure key is produced as long as Equation (24) holds. Hence,
25Here a slightly more general version of the EAT than the one given in this paper is needed, in which the event Ω can be
defined via A,B,X, Y and not only C; see [DFR16] for the details.
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a uniform and independent key of length ℓ as in Equation (25) is produced by the privacy amplification step
unless the smooth min-entropy is not high enough (i.e., the bound in Equation (26) does not hold) or the
privacy amplification protocol was not successful, which happens with probability at most εPA + εs.
According to Lemma 15, either the protocol aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA − εEC, or the
entropy is sufficiently high for us to have
‖ρ˜
K˜AJE|
≈
Ω
− ρUl ⊗ ρ˜JE‖1 ≤ εPA + εs .
Combining both cases above we get that Protocol 2 is sound (that is, it produces identical and secret
keys of length ℓ for Alice and Bob) with soundness error at most εEC + εPA + εs.
5.5 Key rate analysis
Theorem 13 establishes a relation between the length ℓ of the secure key produced by our protocol and the
different error terms. As this relation, given in Equation (25), is somewhat hard to visualise, we analyse the
key rate r = ℓ/n for some specific choices of parameters and compare it to the key rates achieved in device-
dependent QKD with finite resources [SR08a, SR08b] and DIQKD with infinite resources and a restricted
set of attacks [PAB+09].
The key rate depends on the amount of leakage of information due to the error correction step, which
in turn depends on the honest implementation of the protocol. We use the honest i.i.d. implementation
described in Section 5.2 and assume that in the honest case the state of each round is the two-qubit Werner
state ρQAQB = (1−ν) |φ+〉 〈φ+|+νI/4 (and the measurements are as described in Section 5.2). The quantum
bit error rate is then Q = ν2 and the expected winning probability is ωexp =
2+
√
2(1−2Q)
4 .
We emphasise that this is an assumption regarding the honest implementation and it does not in any
way restrict the actions of the adversary (and, in particular, the types of imperfections in the device).
Furthermore, the analysis done below can be adapted to any other honest implementation of interest.
5.5.1 Leakage due to error correction
To compare the rates we first need to explicitly upper bound the leakage of information due to the error
correction protocol, leakEC . As mentioned before, this can be done by evaluating H
ε′EC
0 (A|B˜XYT) on Alice
and Bob’s state in an honest i.i.d. implementation of the protocol, described in Section 5.2.
For this we first use the following relation between Hε0 and H
ε′
max [TSSR11, Lemma 18]:
H
ε′EC
0 (A|B˜XYT) ≤ H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XYT
)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
.
The non-asymptotic version of the asymptotic equipartition property [TCR09, Theorem 9] (see also [Tom12,
Result 5]) tells us that
H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XYT
)
≤ nH(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) +
√
nδ(ε′EC, τ) ,
for τ = 2
√
2Hmax(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) + 1 and δ(ε′EC, τ) = 4 log τ
√
2 log
(
8/ε′2EC
)
.
For the honest implementation of Protocol 2, Hmax(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) = 1 and
H(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) =Pr(Ti = 0) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 0)+
Pr(Ti = 1) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 1)
= (1− γ) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 0)+
γ ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 1)
= (1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp) ,
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Figure 5: The expected key rate r = ℓ/n¯ as a function of the quantum bit error rate Q for several values
of the expected number of rounds n¯. For n¯ = 1015 the curve essentially coincides with the curve for the
i.i.d. asymptotic case [PAB+09, Equation (12)]. The following values for the error terms were chosen:
εEC = 10
−10, εsQKD = 10
−5 and εcQKD = 10
−2.
where the first equality follows from the definition of conditional entropy and the second from the way Ti is
chosen in Protocol 2. The last equality holds since for generation rounds the error rate (i.e., the probability
that Ai and B˜i differ) in the honest case is Q and for test rounds given B˜i, Xi and Yi Bob can guess Ai
correctly with probability ωexp.
We thus have
H
ε′EC
0
(
A|B˜XYT
)
≤ n [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)] +
√
n4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
2 log
(
8/ε′2EC
)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
.
Plugging this into Equation (22) we get
leakEC ≤ n [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)] +
√
n4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
2 log
(
8/ε′2EC
)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
+ log
(
1
εEC
)
.
(30)
5.5.2 Key rate curves
In Appendix B a slightly modified protocol is considered in which, instead of fixing the number of rounds in
the protocol, only the expected number of rounds is fixed.
The completeness and soundness proofs follow the same lines as the proofs above, as detailed in Ap-
pendix B. The analysis presented in the appendix leads to improved key rates for the modified protocol, and
are the ones presented here.26
26The key rate curves for a fixed number of rounds n have the same shape as the curves presented here but require more
signals to achieve the same rates (the difference is roughly two orders of magnitude).
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Figure 6: The expected key rate r = ℓ/n¯ as a function of the expected number of rounds n¯ for several values
of the quantum bit error rate Q. For Q = 0.5%, 2.5%, and 5% the achieved key rates are approximatly r =
87%, 53%, and 22% respectively. The following values for the error terms were chosen: εEC = 10
−10, εsQKD =
10−5 and εcQKD = 10
−2.
In Figure 5 the expected key rate r = ℓ/n¯ is plotted as a function of the quantum bit error rate Q for
several values of the expected number of rounds n¯. For n¯ = 1015 the curve already essentially coincides
with the key rate achieved in the asymptotic i.i.d. case, that is, when restricting the adversary to collective
attacks [PAB+09, Equation (12)] (see also Figure 2 therein). As the key rate for the asymptotic i.i.d. case
was shown to be optimal in [PAB+09] (for practically the same protocol) it acts as an upper bound on the
key rate and the amount of tolerable noise for the general case considered in this work. Hence, for large
enough number of rounds our key rate becomes optimal and the protocol can tolerate up to the maximal
error rate Q = 7.1%.
In an asymptotic analysis (i.e., with infinite resources n¯→∞) it is well understood that the soundness and
completeness errors εsQKD, ε
c
QKD should tend to zero as n¯ increases. However, in the non-asymptotic scenario
considered here these errors are always finite. We therefore fix some values for them which are considered to
be realistic and relevant for actual applications. We choose the parameters such that the security parameters
are at least as good (and in general even better) as in [SR08a], such that a fair comparison can be made.
All other parameters are chosen in a consistent way while (roughly) optimising the key rate.
In Figure 6 r is plotted as a function of n¯ for several values of Q. As can be seen from the figure, the
achieved rates are significantly higher than those achieved in previous works. Moreover, they are practically
comparable to the key rates achieved in device-dependent QKD (see Figure 1 in [SR08a]). The main difference
between the curves for the device-dependent case and the independent one is the minimal value of n¯ which
is required for a positive key rate. (That is, for the protocols considered in [SR08a] one can get a positive
key rate with less rounds.) It is possible that by further optimising the parameters a positive key rate can
also be achieved in our setting in the regime n¯ = 104 − 106 for the different error rates.
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6 Randomness expansion
We show how the entropy accumulation protocol can be used to perform randomness expansion. This can
be achieved based on any non-local game for which one is able to prove a good bound in Equation (5). For
concreteness we focus on the CHSH game, for which an explicit bound is provided by Corollary 12. Although
the protocol can be used to achieve larger expansion factors, we give specific bounds that optimise the linear
output rate, under the assumption that a small linear number of uniformly random bits is available to the
experimenter for the execution of the protocol.
In order to minimise the amount of randomness required to execute the protocol we adapt the main
entropy accumulation protocol, Protocol 1, by deterministically choosing inputs in the generation rounds
from Xg = {0} and Yg = {0}. In particular there is no use for the input 2 to the B device, and no randomness
is required for the generation rounds. 27 Aside from the last step of randomness amplification the remainder
of the protocol is essentially the same as Protocol 1 (in its instantiation with the CHSH game considered in
Section 4). The complete protocol is described as Protocol 3.
Protocol 3 Randomness expansion protocol
Arguments:
G – CHSH game restricted to Xt = Yt = {0, 1}.
D – untrusted device of two components that can play G repeatedly
n ∈ N+ – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] – expected fraction of test rounds
ωexp – expected winning probability in G for an honest (perhaps noisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the statistical confidence interval for the estimation test
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-5:
2: Bob chooses a random bit Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
3: If Ti = 0 Alice and Bob choose (Xi, Yi) = (0, 0). If Ti = 1 they choose uniformly random inputs
(Xi, Yi) ∈ Xt × Yt.
4: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and Bi respectively.
5: If Ti = 1 they set Ci = w(Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi).
6: Alice and Bob abort if
∑
j Cj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n.
7: They return Ext(AB,S) where Ext is the extractor from Lemma 19 and S is a uniformly random seed.
Corollary 12 provides a lower bound on the min-entropy generated by the protocol. Given we are
concerned here not only with generating randomness, but also with expanding the amount of randomness
initially available to users of the protocol, we now evaluate the total number of random bits that is needed
to execute Protocol 3.
Input randomness. Random bits are required to select which rounds are generation rounds, i.e. the
random variable T, to select inputs to the devices in the testing rounds, i.e. those for which Ti = 0, and to
select the seed for the extractor in Step 7.
The random variables Ti are chosen independently according to a biased Bernoulli(γ) distribution. The
following lemma shows that approximately 8h(γ)n uniformly random bits are sufficient to generate the Ti,
provided one allows for the possibility of a small deviation error.
Lemma 17. Let γ > 0. There is an efficient procedure such that for any integer n, given r = 8h(γ)n uni-
formly random bits as inputs the procedure either aborts, with probability at most εSA = exp(−Ω(γ3 log−2 γn)),
or outputs n bits T1, . . . , Tn whose distribution is within statistical distance at most εSA of n i.i.d. Bernoulli(γ)
random variables.
27This requires both users to know which rounds are selected as generation rounds, i.e. to share the random variable Ti. For
the purposes of randomness expansion this does not even require communication as we may assume the parties are co-located.
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Proof. It is well-known that using the interval algorithm [H+97] it is possible to sample exactly from m i.i.d.
Bernoulli(γ) random variables using an expected number of random bits at most h(γ)m + 2; furthermore
the maximum number of random bits needed is at most Cm log γ−1 for some constant C.
In order to obtain a bound on the maximum number of random bits used that holds with high probability,
let α = h(γ) and partition {1, . . . , n} into at most t = ⌈αn⌉ chunks of m = ⌈1/α⌉ consecutive integers each.
Suppose we repeat the interval algorithm for each chunk. Let Ni be the number of uniform bits used to
generate the Tj associated with the i-th chunk. Then by the above E[Ni] ≤ h(γ)m+2 and Ni ≤ Cm log γ−1.
Applying the Hoeffding inequality,
Pr
( t∑
i=1
Ni > 2(h(γ)m+ 2)t
)
≤ e−C′
(h(γ)m+2)2
m2 log2 γ−1 t ≤ e−C′′
γ3
log2 γ−1 n
for some constants C′, C′′ > 0 and given our choice of α. Using mt ≤ 2n and t ≤ n gives the claimed
bound.
Remark 18. If one is willing to settle for a bound on the number of uniform bits used in expectation then
using the procedure from [H+97] it is possible to exactly sample n i.i.d. Bernoulli(γ) random variables using
an expected number of random bits at most h(γ)n+ 2.
It remains to account for the random bits required to generate inputs in the testing rounds, for which Ti =
0. By Hoeffding’s inequality there are at most 2γn such rounds except with probability exp(−Ω(γ2n)) ≤ εSA
for large enough n. Together with Lemma 17 we conclude that 10γn uniformly random bits are sufficient to
execute the protocol with a probability of success (up to but not including step 6) at least 1− e−Ω˜(γ3)n. We
also note that if one is only concerned with the expected number of random bits used then (h(γ) + γ)n+ 2
bits are sufficient.
Extraction. In the last step of the protocol, Step 7, the user applies a quantum-proof extractor to AB
in order to produce a random string that is close to being uniformly distributed. This step requires the use
of an additional seed S of uniformly random bits. We use the following construction based on Trevisan’s
extractor, designed to maximise the output length while not using too much seed.
Lemma 19. For any δ > 0 there is a c = c(δ) > 0 such that the following holds. For all large enough integer
n and any k ≥ δn there is an efficient procedure Ext : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m such that d = ⌈δn⌉ and
m = ⌈k−9 log k⌉, and is such that for εEX = exp(−c(n/ logn)1/2) and any classical-quantum state ρAE such
that HεEXmin (A|E)ρ ≥ k it holds that
‖ρExt(A,S)SE − ρUm ⊗ ρUd ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ 2εEX ,
where S ∈ {0, 1}d is a uniformly distributed random seed and ρUm , ρUd are totally mixed states on m and d
bits respectively.
Proof. We use the construction given in [DPVR12, Corollary 5.1]. To get the parameters stated here we
note that provided c is chosen small enough with respect to δ our choice of εEX ensures that the seed length
d = O(log2(n/εEX) logm) can be made smaller than δn. The conclusion on the trace distance follows from
the guarantee of strong extractor given by [DPVR12, Corollary 5.1] using an argument similar to the proof
of [AFPS15, Lemma 17].
We state the results of the above discussions as the following theorem stating the guarantees of the
randomness expansion protocol.
Theorem 20. Let γ, δ > 0. Let εEX be as in Lemma 19. Then for all large enough n, εEA ∈ (0, 1),
and εs such that εSA < εs + εSA ≤ εEX, Protocol 1 is an (εcEA + εSA, 2εEX)-secure [(8h(γ) + δ)n] →
[n · ηopt(εs − εSA, εEA) − 9 logn] randomness expansion protocol. That is, either Protocol 1 aborts with
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probability greater than εEA or it generates a string of length m ≥ n · ηopt(εs, εEA) − 9 logn (where ηopt is
defined in Equation (8)) such that
‖ρZRE − ρUm ⊗ ρRE‖1 ≤ 2εEX + εSA ,
where R is a register holding all the initial random bits used in the protocol (including the seed S).
Proof. Let D be any device and ρ the state (as defined in Equation (2)) generated right before Step 6 of
Protocol 3. Let Ω (as defined in Equation (3)) be the event that the protocol does not abort, and ρ|Ω the
state conditioned on Ω. Then, applying Corollary 12 we obtain that for any εEA, ε
′
s ∈ (0, 1), either the
protocol aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA or
H
ε′s+εSA
min (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ω > n · ηopt(ε′s, εEA) , (31)
where ηopt is defined in Equation (8) and the additional smoothness parameter εSA accounts for the error in
the verifier’s input sampling procedure, as described in Lemma 17.28 Given the bound Equation (31), the
guarantee on m claimed in the theorem follows from Lemma 19.
Finally, completeness of the protocol follows directly from completeness of the entropy accumulation
protocol, Protocol 1, as stated in Lemma 9, and the verifier’s input sampling procedure, described in
Lemma 17.
Assuming a choice δ = γ, the number of random bits required in the protocol scales linearly, roughly
as ∼ 9γn.
For γ → 1, which corresponds to randomness generation (also called randomness certification, i.e. the
guarantee of “fresh” randomness independent of the inputs) the values of ηopt plotted in Figure 3 give a
good idea of the rate of randomness generation that can be achieved from Protocol 3 for different choices of
the security parameters. The rate is to be compared to the rate that was shown achievable for randomness
expansion in the case of classical adversaries only in [PAM+10] (Figure 2; see also [PM13]). Our result,
in contrast, holds against quantum adversaries. The rate is much better than the ones obtained in [VV12,
MS14a].
For randomness expansion one would select a small value of γ. If γ is a small constant then Theorem 20
guarantees a constant expansion factor. One may wish to go further, by selecting a γ that scales sub-linearly,
polynomially or even poly-logarithmically, in the number of rounds (e.g., to achieve exponential expansion).
It is possible to adapt our results to guarantee a linear production of randomness even for such parameters
by suitably adapting Protocol 3 so that rounds are grouped in blocks, as in the modification of the entropy
accumulation protocol described in Appendix B.
7 Open questions
Several questions are left open.
1. Our results yield essentially optimal values for the leading and second-order constants, c1 and c2, that
govern the achievable rate curves. As loophole-free Bell tests (a necessity for DI cryptography) are
finally being realized [HBD+15, SMSC+15, GVW+15], it becomes increasingly relevant to achieve the
best possible dependence of the rate curves on the number of rounds n, even for very small values
of n. As can be seen from Figures 3 and 5 our rate curves approach (and essentially coincide) with
the optimal curves as the number of rounds increases. One thing that can perhaps still be further
optimized is the dependency on the number of rounds, or in other words, how fast the curves approach
the optimal curve. The explicit dependency on n given in Equation (25) is already close to optimal,
but the numerical analysis used to plot the curves can be made somewhat better for the range of
n = 104 − 106. Although this seems like a minor issue, it can make actual implementations more
feasible.
28The log(13) term in the definition of η in Equation (8) could be replaced by a log(9) to account for the fact that here
dBi = 2, instead of dBi = 3 in Section 4.
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2. Are there similar protocols, based on a different Bell inequality, that can lead to better entropy rates?
To apply our proof to other Bell inequalities one should find a good bound on the min-tradeoff function,
as done in Equation (14) for the CHSH inequality. For many Bell inequalities such bounds are known,
but for the min-entropy instead of the von Neumann entropy. In most cases using a bound on the
min-entropy will result in far from optimal rate curves. Therefore, to adapt our protocol to other
Bell inequalities one should probably bound the min-tradeoff function using the von Neumann entropy
directly. Unfortunately, we do not know of any general technique to achieve such tight bounds.
3. Are there other protocols, e.g., with two-way classical post-processing, which achieve better key rates?
The optimality of our key rates is only with respect to the structure of the considered protocol.
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Appendices
A Summary of Parameters, constants, and variables
Symbol Meaning Relation to other parameters
n ∈ N+ Number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] Expected fraction of Bell violation estimation rounds
ωexp ∈ [0, 1] Expected winning probability in an honest (perhapsnoisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) Width of the statistical confidence intervalfor the Bell violation estimation test
εs Smoothing parameter
εcEA Completeness error of the entropy accumulation protocol Given in Eq. (4)
εEA The error probability of the entropy accumulation protocol
leakEC The leakage of the error correction protocol Given in Eq. (22)
εEC, ε
′
EC Error probabilities of the error correction protocol
εcEC Completeness error of the error correction protocol ε
c
EC = ε
′
EC + εEC
εcPE Completeness error of the parameter estimation step Given in Eq. (23)
εPA Error probability of the privacy amplification protocol Given in Eq. (24)
ℓ Final key length in the DIQKD protocol Given in Eq. (25)
εcQKD Completeness error of the DIQKD protocol ε
c
QKD ≤ εcEC + εcEA + εEC
εsQKD Soundness error of the DIQKD protocol ε
s
QKD ≤ εEC + εPA + εs
εSA Error probability of the input sampling procedure used Given in Lemma 17
in the randomness expansion protocol
εEX Error probability of the extractor used in the Given in Lemma 19
randomness expansion protocol
Table 1: Parameters and constants used throughout the paper
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Random variables and systems Meaning
Xi ∈ X Alice’s input in round i ∈ [n]
Yi ∈ Y Bob’s input in round i ∈ [n]
Ai ∈ A Alice’s output in round i ∈ [n]
Bi ∈ B Bob’s output in round i ∈ [n]
Ti ∈ {0, 1}
Indicator of the estimation test in round i:
Ti =
{
0 i’th round is not a test round
1 i’th round is a test round
Fi ∈ {0, 1} A random uniform bit for the symmetrisation step in round i ∈ [n]
Ci ∈ {⊥, 0, 1}
Indicator of the correlation in the test rounds:
Ci =


⊥ Ti = 0
0 Ti = 1 and the test fails
1 Ti = 1 and the test succeeds .
E Register of Eve’s quantum state
Ri
Register of the (unknown) quantum state ρiQAQB of Alice and
Bob’s devices after step i of the protocol, for i ∈ {0} ∪ [n].
Table 2: Random variables and quantum systems used throughout the paper
B An improved dependency on the test probability γ
In this section we show how the EAT can be used in a slightly different way than what was done in the main
text. This results in an entropy rate which has a better dependency on the probability of a test round γ,
compared to the entropy rate given in Equation (8) in Section 4. The improved entropy rate derived here is
the one used for calculating the key rates of the DIQKD protocol is Section 5.5.2.
B.1 Modified entropy accumulation protocol
We use a different entropy accumulation protocol, given as Protocol 4. In this modified protocol instead of
considering each round separately we consider blocks of rounds. A block is defined by a sequence of rounds:
in each round a test is carried out with probability γ (and otherwise the round is a generation round). The
block ends when a test round is being performed and then the next block begins. If for smax rounds there was
no test, the block ends without performing a test and the next begins. Thus, the blocks can be of different
length, but they all consist at most smax rounds.
In this setting, instead of fixing the number of rounds n in the beginning of the protocol, we fix the
number of blocks m. The expected length of block is
s¯ =
∑
s∈[smax]
[
s(1− γ)(s−1)γ
]
+ smax(1− γ)smax = 1− (1− γ)
smax
γ
=
∑
s∈[smax]
[
(1− γ)(s−1)
]
. (32)
The expected number of rounds is denoted by n¯ = m · s¯.
Compared to the main text, we now have a RV C˜j ∈ {0, 1,⊥} for each block, instead of each round.
Alice and Bob set C˜j to be 0 or 1 depending on the result of the game in the block’s test round (i.e., the
last round of the block), or C˜j =⊥ if a test round was not carried out in the block. By the definition of the
blocks we have Pr[C˜j =⊥] = (1− γ)smax .
Note that the symmetrisation step was dropped in Protocol 4 just for simplicity, as it plays no role in
the considered modification; it can (and should) be handled exactly as done in Section 4.
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Protocol 4 Modified entropy accumulation protocol
Arguments:
G – two-player non-local game
Xg,Xt ⊂ X – generation and test inputs for Alice
Yg,Yt ⊂ Y – generation and test inputs for Bob
D – untrusted device of (at least) two components that can play G repeatedly
m ∈ N+ – number of blocks
smax ∈ N+ –maximal length of a block
γ ∈ (0, 1] – probability of a test round
ωexp – expected winning probability in G for an honest (perhaps noisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the statistical confidence interval for the estimation test
1: For every block j ∈ [m] do Steps 2-9:
2: Set i = 0 and Cj =⊥.
3: If i ≤ smax:
4: Set i = i+ 1.
5: Alice and Bob choose Ti ∈ {0, 1} at random such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
6: If Ti = 0 Alice and Bob choose inputs Xi ∈ Xg and Yi ∈ Yg respectively. If Ti = 1 they choose
inputs Xi ∈ Xt and Yi ∈ Yt.
7: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and Bi respectively.
8: If Ti = 0 Bob updates Bi to Bi =⊥.
9: If Ti = 1 they set C˜j = w (Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi) and i = smax + 1.
10: Alice and Bob abort if
∑
j∈[m] C˜j < [ωexp (1− (1 − γ)smax)− δest] ·m.
B.2 Modified min-tradeoff function
Below, we apply the EAT on blocks of outputs instead of single rounds directly. Let Mj denote the EAT
channels defined by the actions of Steps 2-9 in Protocol 4, combined with the quantum channels that model
the device’s actions in those steps. It is easy to verify that Mj fulfil the necessary conditions given in
Definition 6.
We now construct a min-tradeoff function forMj . Let p˜ be a probability distribution over {0, 1,⊥}. Our
goal is to find Fmin such that
∀j ∈ [m] Fmin(p˜) ≤ inf
σRj−1R′ :Mj(σ)C˜j=p˜
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
Mj(σ)
, (33)
where ~Aj is a vector of varying length (but at most smax). We use Aj,i to denote the i’th entry of ~Aj and
Aj,i−1j,1 = Aj,1 . . . Aj,i−1. Since we will only be interested in the entropy of ~Aj we can also describe it as a
vector of length smax which is initialised to be all ⊥. For every actual round being performed in the block
the value of Aj,i is updated. Thus, the entries of ~Aj which correspond to rounds which were not performed
do not contribute to the entropy. We use similar notation for the other vectors of RVs.
To lower-bound the right-hand side of Equation (33) we first use the chain rule
H
(
~Aj ~Bj| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
=
∑
i∈[smax]
H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 ) . (34)
Next, for every i ∈ [smax],
H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 ) =Pr[T j,i−1j,1 = ~0]H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 = ~0)
+ Pr[T j,i−1j,1 6= ~0]H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 6= ~0)
=(1 − γ)(i−1)H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 = ~0)
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since the entropy is not zero only if the i’th round is being performed in the block, i.e., if a test was not
performed before that round. Plugging this into Eq. (34) we get
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
=
∑
i∈[smax]
(1− γ)(i−1)H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 = ~0) .
Each term in the sum can now be identified as the entropy of a single round. We can therefore use the
bound derived in the main text, as given in Equation (13). For this we denote by ωi the winning probability
in the i’th round (given that a test was not performed before). Then it holds that
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
≥
∑
i∈[smax]
(1 − γ)(i−1)
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)]
, (35)
where, by the actions of the EAT channel Mj , the ωi’s must fulfil the constraint
p˜(1) =
∑
i∈[smax]
γ(1− γ)(i−1)ωi . (36)
Note that, similarly to what was done in the main text, we only need to consider p˜ for which p˜(1)+ p˜(0) =
1 − (1 − γ)smax (otherwise the condition on the min-tradeoff function is trivial, as the infimum is over an
empty set).
To find the min-tradeoff function Fmin(p˜) we therefore need to minimise Equation (35) under the con-
straint of Equation (36). The following lemma shows that the minimum is achieved when all ωi are equal.
Lemma 21. The minimum of the function given on the righthand-side of Equation (35) over ωi constrained
by Equation (36) is achieved for ω∗i =
p˜(1)
1−(1−γ)smax for all i ∈ [smax].
Proof. Let ~ω = ω1, . . . , ωsmax and
f(~ω) ≡
∑
i∈[smax]
(1 − γ)(i−1)
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)]
;
g(~ω) ≡
∑
i∈[smax]
γ(1− γ)(i−1)ωi − p˜(1) .
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, we should look for ~ω∗ such that g(~ω∗) = 0 and ∇f(~ω∗) =
−λ∇g(~ω∗) for some constant λ. ∇f(~ω∗) = −λ∇g(~ω∗) implies that for any i,
(1− γ)(i−1) d
dωi
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)] ∣∣∣
ω∗i
= −λγ(1− γ)(i−1)
and therefore
d
dωi
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)] ∣∣∣
ω∗i
= −λγ .
The function on the left-hand side of the above equation is strictly increasing. Hence, it must be that all ω∗i
are equal to some constant ω∗.
Lastly, we must have g(~ω∗) = 0. Thus,∑
i∈[smax]
γ(1− γ)(i−1)ω∗ − p˜(1) = 0
which means
ω∗ =
p˜(1)∑
i∈[smax] γ(1− γ)(i−1)
=
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax .
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Plugging the minimal values of ωi into Equation (35) we get that
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
≥
∑
i∈[smax]
(1− γ)(i−1)
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax
(
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
= s¯
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax
(
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
,
where we used Equation (32) to get the last equality.
From this point we can follow the same steps as in Section 4 (cutting and gluing the function etc.). The
resulting min-tradeoff function is given by
g(p˜) =


s¯
[
1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p˜(1)1−(1−γ)smax
(
p˜(1)
1−(1−γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
p˜(1)
1−(1−γ)smax ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
s¯ p˜(1)1−(1−γ)smax ∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
]
,
Fmin (p˜, p˜t) =
{
g (p˜) p˜(1) ≤ p˜t(1)
d
dp˜(1)g(p˜)
∣∣
p˜t
· p˜(1) +
(
g(p˜t)− ddp˜(1)g(p˜)
∣∣
p˜t
· p˜t(1)
)
p˜(1) > p˜t(1) .
The min-tradeoff function given above is effectively identical to the one derived in the main text; although
it gives us a bound on the von Neumann entropy in a block, instead of a single round, this bound is exactly
the expected length of a block, s¯, times the entropy in one round. For smax = 1 the min-tradeoff function
constructed in the main text is retrieved.
B.3 Modified entropy rate
Since we apply the EAT on the blocks, the entropy rate is now defined to be the entropy per block. We
therefore get
η(p˜, p˜t, εs, εe) = Fmin (p˜, p˜t)− 1√
m
2
(
log(1 + 2 · 2smax3smax) +
⌈ d
dp˜(1)
g(p˜)
∣∣∣
p˜t
⌉)√
1− 2 log(εs · εe) ,
ηopt(εs, εe) = max
3
4<p˜t(1)<
2+
√
2
4
η(ωexp [1− (1− γ)smax ]− δest, p˜t, εs, εe) ,
and the total amount of entropy is given by
Hεsmin (AB|XYTFE)ρ|Ω > m · ηopt(εs, εEA) =
n¯
s¯
· ηopt(εs, εEA) . (37)
By choosing smax = ⌈ 1γ ⌉ the scaling of the entropy rate with γ is better than the rate derived in the main
text. In particular, a short calculation reveals that the second order term scales, roughly, as
√
n¯/γ instead
of
√
n/γ.
B.4 Modified key rate
To get the final key rate we need to repeat the same steps from the main text, but this time applied to
random variables of varying length.
For this we first observe that, with high probability, the actual number of rounds, n, cannot be much
larger than the expected number of rounds n¯. Let Si be the RV describing the length of block i, for i ∈ [m],
and N the RV describing the total number of rounds. Then N = S1 + · · · + Sm. Since all the Si are
independent, identical, and have values in
[
1, 1γ
]
we have
Pr[N ≥ n¯+ t] ≤ exp
[
− 2t
2γ2
m(1− γ)2
]
.
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Let εt = exp
[
− 2t2γ2m(1−γ)2
]
then
t =
√
−m(1− γ)
2 log εt
2γ2
.
The first step in the derivation of the key rate which needs to be changed is the one given in Equation (29).
The quantity that needs to be upper bounded is H
εs
4
max (B|TEN)ρ|Ωˆ ; N can be included in the entropy since
its value is fixed by T. By the definition of the smooth max-entropy we have
H
εs
4
max (B|TEN) ≤ H
εs
4 −
√
εt
max (B|TEN,N ≤ n¯+ t) .
Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 15 we have
H
εs
4 −
√
εt
max (B|TEN,N ≤ n¯+ t)ρ|Ωˆ < γ(n¯+ t) + 2 log 7
√
n¯+ t
√
1− 2 log ((εs/4−√εt) · (εEA + εEC)) .
With this modification and the modified entropy rate given in Equation (37) we get
Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥
n¯
s¯
· ηopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
−γ(n¯+ t)− 2 log 7√n¯+ t
√
1− 2 log ((εs/4−√εt) · (εEA + εEC)) .
Similarly, the amount of leakage due to the error correction step leakEC should be modified as well.
Following the steps in Section 5.5.1, the quantity to be upper bounded is H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XYTN
)
. Here as well
we have
H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XYTN
)
≤ H
ε′EC
2 −
√
εt
max
(
A|B˜XYTN,N ≤ n¯+ t
)
.
The asymptotic equipartition property can be used with the maximal length n¯+ t to get
H
ε′EC
2 −
√
εt
max
(
A|B˜XYTN,N ≤ n¯+ t
)
≤ (n¯+ t) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) +
√
n¯+ t δ(ε′EC − 2
√
εt, τ) ,
for τ = 2
√
2Hmax(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) + 1 and δ(ε′EC − 2
√
εt, τ) = 4 log τ
√
2 log
(
8/(ε′EC − 2
√
εt)2
)
. Continuing
exactly as in Section 5.5.1 we get
leakEC ≤ (n¯+ t) · [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)] + 4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
n¯+ t
√
2 log (8/(ε′EC − 2
√
εt)2)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
+ log
(
1
εEC
)
.
The parameter εt should be chosen such that the key rate is optimised. The resulting key rates are shown
in Figures 5 and 6 in the main text.
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